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Abstract
The problem of analyzing the effect of privacy concerns on the behavior of selfish utility-
maximizing agents has received much attention lately. Privacy concerns are often modeled by
altering the utility functions of agents to consider also their privacy loss [Xia13, GR11, NOS12,
CCK+13]. Such privacy aware agents prefer to take a randomized strategy even in very simple
games in which non-privacy aware agents play pure strategies. In some cases, the behavior of
privacy aware agents follows the framework of Randomized Response, a well-known mechanism
that preserves differential privacy.
Our work is aimed at better understanding the behavior of agents in settings where their
privacy concerns are explicitly given. We consider a toy setting where agent A, in an attempt
to discover the secret type of agent B, offers B a gift that one type of B agent likes and the
other type dislikes. As opposed to previous works, B’s incentive to keep her type a secret isn’t
the result of “hardwiring” B’s utility function to consider privacy, but rather takes the form of
a payment between B and A. We investigate three different types of payment functions and
analyze B’s behavior in each of the resulting games. As we show, under some payments, B’s
behavior is very different than the behavior of agents with hardwired privacy concerns and might
even be deterministic. Under a different payment we show that B’s BNE strategy does fall into
the framework of Randomized Response.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, as the subject of privacy becomes an increasing concern, many works have discussed
the potential privacy concerns of economic utility-maximizing agents. Obviously, utility-maximizing
agents are worried about the effect of revealing personal information in the current game on future
transactions, and wish to minimize potential future losses. In addition, some agents may simply
care about what some outside observer, who takes no part in the current game, believes about
them. Such agents would like to optimize the effect of their behavior in the current game on the
beliefs of that outside observer. Yet specifying the exact way in which information might affect the
agents’ future payment or an outside observer’s beliefs is a complicated and intricate task.
Differential privacy (DP), a mathematical model for privacy, developed for statistical data anal-
ysis [DMNS06, DKM+06], avoids the need for such intricate modeling by providing a worst-case
bound on an agents’ exposure to privacy-loss. Specifically, by using a -differentially private mech-
anism, agents can guarantee that the belief of any observer about them changes by no more than a
multiplicative factor of e ≈ 1 +  once this observer sees the outcome of the mechanism [Dwo06] .
Furthermore, as pointed out in [GR11, NOS12], using a -differentially private mechanism the agents
guarantee that, in expectation, any future loss increases by no more than a factor of e−1 ≈ . A re-
cent line of work [Xia13, GR11, NOS12, CCK+13] has used ideas from differential privacy to model
and analyze the behavior of privacy-awareness in game-theoretic settings. The aforementioned
features of DP allow these works to bypass the need to model future transactions. Instead, they
model privacy aware agents as selfish agents with utility functions that are “hardwired” to trade off
between two components: a (positive) reward from the outcome of the mechanism vs a (negative)
loss from their non-private exposure. This loss can be upper-bounded using DP, and hence in some
cases can be shown to be dominated by the reward (of carefully designed mechanisms), showing
that privacy concerns don’t affect an agent’s behavior.
However, in other cases, the behavior of privacy-aware agents may differ drastically from the
behavior of classical, non-privacy aware agents. For example, consider a toy-game in which B tells
A which of the two free gifts that A offers (or coupons as we call it, for reasons to be explained later)
B would like to receive. We characterize B using one of two types, 0 or 1; where type 0 prefers
the first gift and type 1 prefers the second one. (This is a rephrasing of the “Rye or Wholewheat”
game discussed in [NOS12].) Therefore it is simple to see that a non-privacy-aware agent always
(deterministically) asks for the gift that matches her type. In contrast, if we model the privacy loss
of a privacy-aware agent using DP as in the work of Ghosh and Roth [GR11] (and the value of the
coupon is large enough), a privacy-aware agent takes a randomized strategy. (See Section 2.2.1.)
Specifically, the agent plays Randomized Response, a standard differentially private mechanism that
outputs a random choice slightly biased towards the agent’s favorable action.
However, it was argued [NOS12, CCK+13] that it is not realistic to use the worst-case model of
DP to quantify the agent’s privacy loss and predict her behavior. Differential privacy should only
serve as an upper bound on the privacy loss, whereas the agent’s expected privacy loss can (and
should in fact) be much smaller — depending on the agent’s predictions regarding future events,
adversary’s prior belief about her, the types and strategies of other agents, and the random choices
of the mechanism and of other agents. As discussed above, these can be hard to model, so it is
tempting to use a worst-case model like differential privacy.
But what happens if we can formulate the agent’s future transactions? What if we know that
the agent is concerned with the belief of a specific adversary, and we can quantify the effects of
changes to that belief? Is the behavior of a classical selfish agent in that case well-modeled by such
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a “DP-hardwired” privacy-aware agent? Will she even randomize her strategy? In other words, we
ask:
What is the behavior of a selfish utility-maximizing agent in a setting with clear privacy
costs?
More specifically, we ask whether we can take the above-mentioned toy-game and alter it by intro-
ducing payments between A and B such that the behavior of a privacy-aware agent in the toy-game
matches the behavior of classical (non-privacy aware) agent in the altered game. In particular, in
case B takes a randomized strategy — does her behavior preserve -differential privacy, and for
what value of ? The study of these questions may also provide insights relevant for traditional,
non-game-theoretic uses of differential privacy — helping us understand how tightly differential
privacy addresses the concerns of data subjects, and thus providing guidance in the setting of the
privacy parameter  or the use of alternative, non-worst-case variants of differential privacy (such
as [BGKS13]).
Our model. In this work we consider multiple games that model an interaction between an agent
which has a secret type and an adversary whose goal is to discover this type. Though the games
vary in the resulting behavior of the agents, they all follow a common outline which is similar to
the toy game mentioned above. Agent A offers B a free coupon, that comes in one of two types
{0, 1}. Agent B has a secret type t ∈ {0, 1} chosen from a known prior (D0, D1), such that a type-t
agent has positive utility ρt for type-t coupon and zero utility for a type-(1 − t) coupon. And so
the game starts with B sending A a signal tˆ indicating the requested type of coupon. (Formally,
B’s utility for the coupon is ρt1[tˆ=t] for some parameters ρ0, ρ1.) Following this interaction, agent
C, who viewed the signal tˆ that B sent, challenges B into a game — with C taking action t˜ and
incurring a payment from B of P (t˜, t). To avoid the need to introduce a third party into the game,
we identify C with A.1 Figure 1 gives a schematic representation of the game’s outline.
We make a few observations of the above interaction. We aim to model a scenario where B
has the most incentive to hide her true type whereas A has the most incentive to discover B’s
type. Therefore, all of the payments we consider have the property that if B’s type is t∗ then
t∗ = arg maxt˜ P (t˜, t
∗). Furthermore, the game is modeled so that the payments are transferred
from B to A, which makes A’s and B’s goals as opposite as possible. (In fact, past the stage
where B sends a signal tˆ, we have that A and B plays a zero-sum game.) We also note that A
and B play a Bayesian game (in extensive form) as A doesn’t know the private type of B, only its
prior distribution. We characterize Bayesian Nash Equilibria (BNE) in this paper and will show
that in each game, the BNE is unique except when parameters of the game satisfy certain equality
constraints. It is not difficult to show that the strategies at every BNE of our games are part of a
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE), i.e. a subgame-perfect refinement of the BNE. However, we
focus on BNE in this paper as the equilibrium refinement doesn’t bring any additional insight to
our problem.
Our results and paper organization. First, in Section 2, following preliminaries we discuss
the DP-hardwired privacy-aware agent as defined by Ghosh and Roth [GR11] and analyze her
behavior in our toy game. Our analysis shows that given sufficiently large coupon valuations ρt,
1Hence the reason for the name “The Coupon Game”. We think of A as G – an “evil” car-insurance company
that offers its client a coupon either for an eyewear store or for a car race; thereby increasing the client’s insurance
premium based on either the client’s bad eyesight or the client’s fondness for speedy and reckless driving.
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Figure 1: A schematic view of the privacy game we model.
both types of B agent indeed play Randomized Response. We also discuss conditions under which
other models of DP-hardwired privacy-aware agents play a randomized strategy.
Following preliminaries, we consider three different games. These games follow the general
coupon-game outline, yet they vary in their payment function. The discussion for each of the games
follows a similar outline. We introduce the game, then analyze the two agents’ BNE strategies and
see if the strategy of the B agent is indeed randomized or pure (and in case it is randomized —
whether or not it follows Randomized Response for some value of ). We also compare the coupon
game to a “benchmark game” where B takes no action and A guesses B’s type without any signal
from B. Investigating whether it is even worth while for A to offer such a coupon, we compare A’s
profit between the two games.2 The payment functions we consider are the following.
1. In Section 3 we consider the case where the payment function is given by a proper scoring rule.
Proper scoring rules allows us to quantify the B’s cost to any change in A’s belief about her
type. We show that in the case of symmetric scoring rules (scoring rules that are invariant
to relabeling of event outcomes) both types of B agent follow a randomized strategy that
causes A’s posterior belief on the types to resemble Randomized Response. That is, initially
A’s belief on B being of type-0 (resp. type-1) is D0 (resp. D1); but B plays in a way such
that after viewing the tˆ = 0 signal, A’s belief that B is of type-0 (resp. type-1) is 1+2 (resp.
1−
2 ) for some value of  (and vice-versa in the case of the tˆ = 1 signal with the same ).
2. In Section 4 we consider the case where the payments between A and B are the result of
A guessing correctly B’s type. A views the signal tˆ and then guesses a type t˜ ∈ {0, 1} and
receives a payment of 1[t˜=t] from B. This payment models the following viewpoint of B’s
future losses: there is a constant gap (of one “unit of utility”) between interacting with an
agent that knows B’s type to an agent that does not know her type. We show that in this
case, if the coupon valuations are fixed as ρ0 and ρ1, then at least one type of B agent plays
deterministically. However, if B’s valuation for the coupon is sampled from a continuous
distribution, then A’s strategy effectively dictates a threshold with the following property:
any B agent whose valuation for the coupon is below the threshold lies and signals tˆ = 1− t,
and any agent whose valuation is above the threshold signals truthfully tˆ = t. Hence, an A
agent who does not know B’s valuation thinks of B as following a randomized strategy.
3. In Section 5 we consider a variation of the previous game where A also has the option to
opt out and not challenge B into a payment game — to report ⊥ and in return get no
payment (i.e., P (⊥, t) = 0). We show that in such a game, under a very specific setting of
parameters, the only BNE is such where both types of B agent take a randomized strategy.
2The benchmark game is not to be confused with the toy-game we discussed earlier in this introduction. In the
toy game, A takes no action and B decides on a signal. In the benchmark game, B takes no action and A decides
which action to take based on the specific payment function we consider in each game.
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Under alternative settings of the game’s parameters, the strategy of B is such that at least
one of the two types plays deterministically.
Conclusions and future directions appear in Section 6, where we provide a discussion of our results.
We find it surprising to see how minor changes to the privacy payments lead to diametrically
different behaviors. In particular, we see the existence of a threshold phenomena. Under certain
parameter settings in the game we consider in item 3 above, we have that if the value of the coupon
is above a certain threshold then at least one of the two types of B agent plays deterministically;
and if the value of the coupon is below this threshold, B randomizes her behavior s.t. tˆ = t w.p.
close to 12 .
1.1 Related Work
The study of the intersection between mechanism design and differential privacy began with the
seminal work of McSherry and Talwar [MT07], who showed that an -differentially private mech-
anism is also -truthful. The first attempt at defining a privacy-aware agent was of Ghosh and
Roth [GR11] who quantified the privacy loss using a linear approximation vi ·  where vi is an
individual parameter and  is the level of differential privacy that a mechanism preserves. Other
applications of differentially privacy mechanisms in game theoretic settings were studied by Nissim
et al [NST12]. The work of Xiao [Xia13] initiated the study of mechanisms that are truthful even
when you incorporate the privacy loss into the agents’ utility functions. Xiao’s original privacy loss
measure was the mutual information between the mechanism’s output and the agent’s type. Nissim
et al [NOS12] (who effectively proposed a preliminary version of our coupon game called “Rye or
Wholewheat”) generalized the models of privacy loss to only assume that it is upper bounded by
vi · . Chen et al [CCK+13] proposed a refinement where the privacy loss is measured with respect
to the given input and output. Fleischer and Lyu [FL12] considered the original model of agents as
in Ghosh and Roth [GR11] but under the assumption that vi, the value of the privacy parameter
of each agent, is sampled from a known distribution.
Several papers in economics look at the potential loss of agents from having their personal data
revealed. In fact, one folklore objection to the Vickrey auction is that in a repeated setting, by
providing the sellers with the bidders’ true valuations for the item, the bidders subject themselves
to future loss should the seller prefer to run a reserved-price mechanism in the future. In the context
of repeated interaction between an agent and a company, there have been works [CTW12, BBM13]
studying the effect of price differentiation based on an agent allowing the company to remember
whether she purchased the same item in the past. Interestingly, strategic agents realize this effect
and so they might “haggle” — reject a price below their valuation for the item in round 1 so
that they’d be able to get even lower price in round 2. In that sense, the fact that the agents
publish their past interaction with the company actually helps the agents. Other work [CP06]
discusses a setting where a buyer sequentially interacts with two different sellers, and characterizes
the conditions under which the first seller prefers not to give the buyer’s information to the second
seller. Concurrently with our work, Gradwohl and Smorodinsky [GS14], whose motivation is to
analyze the effect of privacy concerns, introduce a framework of games in which an agent’s utility
is affected by both her actions and how her actions are perceived by a third party.
The privacy games that we propose and analyze in this paper fall into the class of signaling
games [MCWG95], where a sender (B in our game) with a private type sends a message (i.e. a
signal) to a receiver (A in our game) who then takes an action. The payoffs of both players depend
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on the sender’s message, the receiver’s action, and the sender’s type. Signaling games have been
widely used in modeling behavior in economics and biology. The focus is typically on understanding
when signaling is informative, i.e. when the message of the sender allows the receiver to infer the
sender’s private type with certainty, especially in settings when signaling is costly (e.g. Spence’s
job market signaling game [Spe73]). In our setting, however, informative signaling violates privacy.
We are interested in characterizing when the sender plays in a way such that the receiver cannot
infer her type deterministically.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Equilibrium Concept
We model the games between A and B as Bayesian extensive-form games. However, instead of
using the standard Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE), which is a refinement of Bayesian Nash
Equilibrium (BNE) for extensive-form games, as our solution concept, we analyze BNE for our
games. It can be shown that all of the BNEs considered in our paper can be “extended” to PBEs
(by appropriately defining the beliefs of agent A about agent B at all points in the game). We
thus avoid defining the more subtle concept of PBE as the refinement doesn’t provide additional
insights for our problem. Below we define BNE.
A Bayesian game between two agents A and B is specified by their type spaces (ΓA,ΓB), a
prior distribution Π over the type spaces (according to which nature draws the private types of the
agents), sets of available actions (CA, CB), and utility functions, ui : ΓA × ΓB × CA × CB → R,
i ∈ {A,B}. A mixed or randomized strategy of agent i maps a type of agent i to a distribution
over her available actions, i.e. σi : Γi → ∆(Ci), where ∆(Ci) is the probability simplex over Ci.
When σi deterministically maps a type to an action, it is called a pure strategy. The Bayesian Nash
Equilibrium (BNE) of the two-player game is defined as follows.
Definition 2.1. A strategy profile (σA, σB) is a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium if
E[ui(Ti, T−i, σi(Ti), σ−i(T−i))|Ti = ti] ≥ E[ui(Ti, T−i, σ′i(Ti), σ−i(T−i))|Ti = ti]
for all i ∈ {A,B}, all types ti ∈ Γi occurring with positive probability, and all strategies σ′i, where
σ−i and T−i denote the strategy and type of the other agent respectively and the expectation is taken
over the randomness of agent type T−i and the randomness of the strategies, σi, σ−i and σ′i.
In other words, a strategy profile (σA, σB) is a BNE if both agents maximize their expected
utility by playing σi in responding to the other player’s strategy σ−i, i.e. they both play best
response.
As mentioned in Section 1.1, our games between A and B belong to the class of signaling
games. For signaling games, the terms separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium are often
used to characterize when signaling is fully informative. At a separating equilibrium, a player’s
strategy allows the other player to deterministically infer her private type, while at a pooling
equilibrium multiple types of a player may take the same action, preventing the other player to
infer her type with certainty.
2.2 Differential Privacy
In order to define differential privacy, we first need to define the notion of neighboring inputs.
Inputs are elements in X n for some set X , and two inputs I, I ′ ∈ X n are called neighbors if the
two are identical on the details of all individuals (all coordinates) except for at most one.
Definition 2.2 ([DMNS06]). An algorithm ALG which maps inputs into some range R satisfies
-differential privacy if for all pairs of neighboring inputs I, I ′ and for all subsets S ⊂ R it holds
that Pr[ALG(I) ∈ S] ≤ ePr[ALG(I ′) ∈ S].
One of the simplest algorithms that achieve -differential privacy is called Randomized Re-
sponse [KLN+08, DS10], which dates back to the 60s [War65]. This algorithm is best illustrated
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over a binary input, where each individual is represented by a single binary bit (therefore a neigh-
boring instance is a neighbor in which one individual is represented by a different bit), Randomized
Response works by perturbing the input. For each individual i represented by the bit bi, the al-
gorithm randomly and independently picks a bit bˆi s.t. Pr[bˆi = bi] =
1+
2 for some  ∈ [0, 1).
It follows from the definition of the algorithm that it satisfies ln(1+1−) ≈ 2-differential privacy.
Randomized Response is sometimes presented as a distributed algorithm, where each individual
randomly picks bˆi locally, and reports bˆi publicly. Therefore, it is possible to view this work as
an investigation of the type of games in which selfish utility-maximizing agents truthfully follow
Randomized Response, rather than sending some arbitrary bit as bˆi.
In this work, we define certain games and analyze the behavior of the two types of B agent in
the BNE of these games. And so, denoting B’s strategy as σB, we consider the implicit algorithm
σB(t) that tells a type-t agent what probability mass to put on the 0-signal and on the 1-signal.
Knowing B’s strategy σB, we say that B satisfies ln(Xgame)-differential privacy where
3
Xgame
def
= Xgame(σB) = max
t,tˆ∈{0,1}
(
Pr[σB(t) = tˆ]
Pr[σB(1− t) = tˆ]
)
We are interested in finding settings where Xgame(σ
∗
B) is finite, where σ
∗
B denotes B’s BNE strategy.
We say B plays a Randomized Response strategy in a game whenever her BNE strategy σ∗B satisfies
Pr[σ∗B(0) = 0] = Pr[σ
∗
B(1) = 1] = p for some p ∈ [1/2, 1).
2.2.1 Privacy-Aware Agents.
The notion of privacy-aware agents has been developed through a series of works [Xia13, GR11,
NOS12, CCK+13]. The utility function of our privacy-aware agent B is of the form uB = u
out
B −uprivB .
The first term, uoutB is the utility of agent B from the mechanism. The second term, u
priv
B , represents
the agent’s privacy loss. The exact definition of uprivB (and even the variables u
priv
B depends on)
varies between the different works mentioned above, but all works bound the privacy-loss of an
agent that interacts with a mechanism that satisfies -differential privacy by uprivB ≤ v ·  for some
v > 0. Here we argue about the behavior of a privacy-aware agent with the maximal privacy loss
function, which is the type of agent considered by Ghosh and Roth [GR11] (i.e., the agent’s privacy
loss when interacting with a mechanism that satisfies -differential privacy is exactly v ·  for some
v > 0).
Recall our toy game: B sends a signal tˆ and gets a coupon of type tˆ. Therefore, the outcome of
this simple game is tˆ, precisely the action that B takes. B’s type is picked randomly to be 0 w.p.
D0 and 1 w.p. D1, and a B agent of type t has valuation of ρt for a coupon of type t. Therefore, in
this game uoutB = ρt1[tˆ=t]. The mechanism we consider is σ
∗
B, B’s utlity-maximizing strategy, which
we think of as the implicit algorithm that tells a type-t agents what probability mass to put on
sending the tˆ = 0 signal and what mass to put on the tˆ = 1 signal. As noted above, this strategy
satisfies ln(Xgame)-differential privacy, and so u
priv
B (σ
∗
B) = v · ln(Xgame) for some parameter v > 0.
Assuming D0ρ0 6= D1ρ1, our proof shows that this privacy-aware agent chooses essentially between
two alternatives in our toy game: either both types take the same deterministic strategy and send
the same signal (Pr[σ∗B(0) = b] = Pr[σ
∗
B(1) = b] = 1 for some b ∈ {0, 1}); or the agent randomizes
her behavior and plays using Randomized Response: Pr[σ∗B(0) = 0] = Pr[σ
∗
B(1) = 1] ∈ [12 , 1). We
show that for sufficiently large values of the coupon the latter alternative is better than the first.
3We use the convention 0
0
= 1.
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Theorem 2.3. Let B be a privacy-aware agent, whose privacy loss is given by v ln(Xgame) for some
v > 0. Assume that there exists an α > 0 s.t. for sufficiently large values of ρ0, ρ1 it holds that
min{ρ0, ρ1} ≥ α · (ρ0 + ρ1). Then, the unique strategy σ∗B that maximizes B’s utility is randomized
and satisfies: Pr[σ∗B(0) = 0] = Pr[σ
∗
B(1) = 1] = p
∗ for some p∗ ∈ [12 , 1).
Proof. Recall, the type of B is chosen randomly to be 0 w.p. D0 and 1 w.p. D1. Given a strategy
σB for B, we denote p = Pr[σB(0) = 0] and q = Pr[σB(1) = 1] (so Pr[σB(0) = 1] = 1 − p and
Pr[σB(1) = 0] = 1− q). Therefore,
Xgame(σB) = Xgame(p, q) = max
{
p
1− q ,
1− q
p
,
q
1− p,
1− p
q
}
Note that Xgame(p, q) ≥ 1, with equality iff p = 1−q (which means σB(t) is independent of t and B
reveals no information about her type). And so B aims to maximizes the following utility function:
uB = D0ρ0p+D1ρ1q− v ln(Xgame). When the strategy that optimizes B’s utility, denoted (p∗, q∗),
satisfies p∗ = q∗ = 1/2+ for some  ∈ [0, 12) then we say that B plays using Randomized Response.
First, observe that if p + q < 1 then Xgame > 1 and the utility of B is D0ρ0p + D1ρ1q −
v ln(Xgame) ≤ D0ρ0p + D1ρ1q, so B can always improve the utility by replacing setting either
(p, q) = (1, 0) or (p, q) = (0, 1). The same argument holds for any (p, q) where p + q = 1 and
both are not integral. (If D0ρ0 = D1ρ1 then the agent in indifferent between any (p, q) satisfying
p = 1 − q.) Secondly, observe that the maximum cannot be obtained for (p = 1, q > 0) or
(p > 0, q = 1), because in that case Xgame shoots to infinity, so the privacy loss is infinite. Therefore,
if there exist a strategy (p, q) s.t. p > 1 − q and p, q ∈ (0, 1) whose utility is strictly greater than
max{D0ρ0, D1ρ1}, then it is a utility maximizing strategy. (Otherwise, one of the two strategies
(0, 1) or (1, 0) maximizes B’s utility.)
Suppose that the maximum is obtained on some (p∗, q∗) with p∗ + q∗ > 1 and q∗ > p∗. This
means that Xgame =
p
1−q > 1. For any (p, q) in a small enough neighborhood of (p
∗, q∗) we can
differentiate uB and it holds that
D0ρ0 − v
Xgame(p∗, q∗)
(
∂
∂pXgame(p
∗, q∗)
)
= 0 , D1ρ1 − v
Xgame(p∗, q∗)
(
∂
∂qXgame(p
∗, q∗)
)
= 0
with ∂∂pXgame =
1
1−q and
∂
∂qXgame =
p
(1−q)2 , we have
D1ρ1
D0ρ0
= p
∗
1−q∗ , and so D0ρ0p
∗ + D1ρ1q∗ =
D1ρ1. Denote X
∗
game
def
= Xgame(p
∗, q∗) = p
∗
1−q∗ , and deduce that in this case the maximal utility is
D0ρ0p
∗+D1ρ1q∗− v ln(X∗game) = D1ρ1− v ln
(
D1ρ1
D0ρ0
)
< D1ρ1 ≤ max{D0ρ0, D1ρ1}. Hence B is still
better off playing either (0, 1) or (1, 0). The case with p∗ > q∗ (or equivalently q∗(1−q∗) > p∗(1−p∗))
is symmetric, and so B prefers playing (0, 1) or (1, 0).
It remains to check the case of p∗ = q∗, with p∗ + q∗ = 2p∗ > 1. In this case we have Xgame =
p∗
1−p∗ , and the utility function of B is the univariate function (D0ρ0 +D1ρ1)p+ v ln
(
p
1−p
)
. Setting
the derivative u′B(p
∗) = 0 we have D0ρ0 + D1ρ1 = vp∗(1−p∗) , or p
∗ = 12
(
1 +
√
1− 4vD0ρ0+D1ρ1
)
.
Denoting Y = D0ρ0 +D1ρ1, we now use the assumption that ρ0, ρ1 = Ω(ρ0 + ρ1) and observe that
max{D0ρ0, D1ρ1} = (1−c)Y for some constant c > 0. Therefore, B prefers playing this randomized
strategy if
uB(p
∗) = 12Y
(
1 +
√
1− 4vY
)
− v ln
1 +
√
1− 4vY
1−
√
1− 4vY
 > (1− c)Y
10
Since limY→∞
uB(p
∗)
Y = 1 then for a large enough value of Y , the above inequality holds.
As an immediate corollary of the proof, consider any alternative definition of a privacy aware
agent in which the privacy valuation uprivB (i) depends only on the strategy σB, is (ii) non-negative,
(iii) upper bounded by v ln(Xgame) for some v > 0 and (iv) u
priv
B = ∞ whenever Xgame = ∞. We
argue that the utility maximizing strategy of such an agent is also randomized. (Observe that we
no longer guarantee that B’s optimal strategy σ∗B satisfies Pr[σ
∗
B(0) = 0] = Pr[σ
∗
B(1) = 1].)
To see that, observe that whenever p = 1 − q we have that Xgame = 0 so the privacy loss of
an agent is 0. Therefore, playing either (p, q) = (1, 0) or (0, 1), the agent can guarantee a utility
of max{D0ρ0, D1ρ1}. In contrast, should the agent play any (p, q) with p < 1− q, then her utility
is upper bounded by D0p + D1q ≤ max{D0ρ0, D1ρ1}, because the privacy loss is non-negative.
Therefore, the agent prefers playing (p, q) = (1, 0) or (0, 1) to any (p, q) with p < 1− q. Secondly,
since we assume infinite privacy loss whenever Xgame, then B utility maximizing strategy cannot
satisfy that p = 1 and q > 0 (or vice-versa). Lastly, the proof of Theorem 2.3 gives a strategy (p, q)
with p > 1 − q where the lower bound on B’s utility is greater than max{D0ρ0, D1ρ1}. It follows
that B strictly prefers playing some strategy (p, q) with p, q ∈ (0, 1) over playing (p, q) = (1, 0) or
(p, q) = (0, 1).
2.2.2 The two types of B agent as different players.
The above analysis assumed B is an agent playing this coupon game, decides on a strategy before
the realization of her type, and sticks to that strategy even after her type is revealed to her. It
is possible though to think of the two types of B agents as two different agents ex-post – after
each agent is revealed her own type. As we show, the analysis in this case is slightly different.
Observe that in this case we discuss a straight-forward Nash-equilibrium, as both agents know their
respective types. In the following, we continue using our notation from earlier, where Pr[σ(i) = tˆ]
denotes the probability a B agent of type t = i sends the signal tˆ according to strategy σ.
Theorem 2.4. Consider the 2-player game where player i ∈ {0, 1} is a type t = i B agent. Assume
ρ0 = ρ1 = ρ and that ρ is sufficiently large. Then there exists some z
∗ ∈ (0, vρ) s.t. any NE of the
game falls into one of three categories
• Pr[σ(0) = 0] = Pr[σ(1) = 0] = 1−z for some z ∈ [0, z∗]. (Both agents take the same strategy
and send the signal tˆ = 0 with high probability 1− z.)
• Pr[σ(0) = 0] = Pr[σ(1) = 0] = z for some z ∈ [1−z∗, 1]. (Both agents take the same strategy
and send the signal tˆ = 1 with high probability 1− z.)
• Pr[σ(0) = 0] = Pr[σ(1) = 1] = z for some z ∈ [1 − vρ , z∗]. (Both agents play randomized
response and report truthfully tˆ = t with the same probability z.)
Proof. We continue using the same notation from Theorem 2.3: p = Pr[σ(0) = 0] and q =
Pr[σ(1) = 1], and so Xgame = Xgame(p, q) as denoted in the proof of Theorem 2.3. In particu-
lar, when p + q ≥ 1 it holds that Xgame(p, q) = p1−q when p ≤ q, and Xgame(p, q) = q1−p when
p ≥ q.
First of all, observe that the utilities of both agents are symmetric: uB,0(p, q) = ρp−v ln(Xgame(p, q))
and uB,1(p, q) = ρq − v ln(Xgame(p, q)). Secondly, observe that if one agent plays determinisit-
cally Pr[σ(t) = tˆ] = 1 then unless the other type deterministically sends the same signal, then
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Xgame(p, q) =∞ causing both agents to have utility of −∞. It is therefore clear that the strategies
(p, q) = (1, 0) and (p, q) = (0, 1) are both NEs.
To find the remaining NEs of the game, we fix a certain strategy for the t = 1 agent, denoted
z = Pr[σ(1) = 1], and see what is the strategy x = Pr[σ(0) = 0] that type t = 0 agent prefers
deviating to. Since both agents are symmetric, then our analysis also translates to an analysis of
type t = 1. Before continuing with our analysis, we point out to the following two functions.
• Fix z and denote f(x) = ρx− v ln( z1−x). Since f ′(x) = ρ− v1−x is decreasing on the interval
[0, 1), we have that f is maximized at x = 1− vρ . In particular, f is strictly increasing on the
interval [0, 1− vρ ] and strictly decreasing on the interval [1− vρ , 1).
• Fix z and denote g(x) = ρx−v ln( x1−z ). Since g′(x) = ρ− vx and it is an increasing function on
the interval [0, 1] then g(x) is strictly decreasing on the (0, vρ) interval and strictly increasing
on the [vρ , 1] interval.
We return on our NE analysis. First, for any z, it is evident that t = 0 agent has incentive to
deviate if x < 1− z. (In response to z, the t = 0 agent increases her utility by deviating to playing
Pr[σ(0) = 0] = 1− z since Xgame(1− z, z) = 0.)
Assume z < 1/2 for now. Therefore x ∈ [1 − z, 1], otherwise the t = 0 agent has incentive
to deviate. Since x ≥ 1 − z ≥ 1/2 > z then Xgame = z1−x so type t = 0 agent’s utility is f(x).
Since f is strictly decreasing on the interval [1− vρ , 1) we have that if 1− z ≥ 1− vρ then the type
t = 0 agent has no incentive to deviate when x = 1 − z. I.e., type t = 0 agent does not deviate
from any strategy (p, q) = (1 − z, z) with z ≤ vρ . In addition, type t = 0 doesn’t deviate from
(p, q) = (1− vρ , z) for vρ < z < 1/2.
Assume now the case 1/2 ≤ z. Again, we only need to consider x ∈ [1 − z, 1], so either
x ∈ [1− z, z) or x ∈ [z, 1]. In the former case, the utility of the type t = 0 agent is g(x), and in the
latter her utility is f(x). Therefore:
• when z < 1 − vρ she considers only two possible strategies: x = 1 − vρ (which maximizes
f(x) on the interval [z, 1]), or x = z (which maximizes g(x) on the interval [1 − z, z]). As
g(z) = f(z) < f(1 − vρ) we deduce that in this case, type t = 0 agent does not deviate only
from the strategy (1− vρ , z).
• when z ≥ 1 − vρ she considers only two possible strategies: x = z (which maximizes f(x) on
the interval [z, 1]) , or x = 1 − z (which might maximize g(x) on the interval [1 − z, z]). As
g(1 − z) = v and f(z) = ρz − v ln( z1−z ) we have that f(z) − g(1 − z) ≤ 0 for any z > z∗ for
some z∗ (the solution of f(z)− g(z) = 0). Observe that 1− vρ < z∗. We deduce that for any
z ∈ [1 − vρ , z∗] the type t = 0 agent doesn’t deviate from the strategy (p, q) = (z, z); and for
z ∈ [z∗, 1] type t = 0 agent does not deviate from (p, q) = (1− z, z).
Recall that the type t = 1 agent is symmetric to type t = 0 agent, with the same utility function.
This implies that any (1 − vρ , q) cannot be a NE since type t = 1 agent prefers to deviate, unless
q = 1− vρ . Therefore, we essentially characterized the NEs of the game, as specified in the theorem
statement.
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3 The Coupon Game with Scoring Rules Payments
In this section, we model the payments between A and B using a proper scoring rule (see below).
This model is a good “first-attempt” model for the following two reasons. (i) Proper scoring rules
assign profit to A based on the accuracy of her belief, so A has incentives to improve her prior belief
on B’s type. (ii) As we show, in this model it is possible to quantify the B’s trade-off between an -
change in the belief and the cost that B pays A. In that aspect, this model gives a clear quantifiable
trade-off that explains what each additional unit of -differential privacy buys B. Interestingly,
proper scoring rules were recently applied in the context of differential privacy [GLRS14] (yet in a
very different capacity).
Proper scoring rules (see surveys [Win96, GR07]) were devised as a method to elicit experts to
report their true prediction about some random variable. For a {0, 1}-valued random variable X,
an expert is asked to report a prediction x ∈ [0, 1] about the probability that X = 1. We pay her
f1(x) if indeed X = 1 and f0(x) otherwise. A proper scoring rule is a pair of functions (f0, f1) such
that arg maxx Et←X [ft(x)] = Pr[X = 1]. Hence a risk-neutral agent’s best strategy is to report
x = Pr[X = 1]. Most frequently used proper scoring rules are symmetric (or label-invariant) rules,
where ∀x, f1(x) = f0(1−x) (also referred to as neutral scoring rules in [CDPV14]). With symmetric
proper scoring rules, the payment to an expert reporting x as the probability of a random variable
X to be 1, is identical to the payment of an expert reporting (1 − x) as the probability of the
random variable (1−X) to be 1. Additional background regarding proper scoring rules is deferred
to Appendix A.
3.1 The Game with Scoring Rule Payments
We now describe the game, and analyze its BNE. In this game A interacts with a random B from
a population that has D0 fraction of type 0 agents and D1 fraction of type 1 agents. Wlog we
assume throughout Sections 3, 4 and 5 that D0 ≥ D1. A aims to discover B’s secret type. She has
utility that is directly linked to her posterior belief on B’s type and A reports her belief that B is
of type 1. A’s payments are given by a proper scoring rule, composed of two functions (f0, f1), so
that after reporting a belief of x, a B agent of type t pays ft(x) to A.
A benchmark game. First consider the following straight forward (and more boring) game
where B does nothing, A merely reports x – her belief that B is of type 1. In this game A gets paid
according to a proper scoring rule — i.e., A gets a payment of FD1(x)
def
= D0f0(x) + D1f1(x) in
expectation. Since (f0, f1) is a proper scoring rule, A maximizes her expected payment by reporting
x = D1. So, in this game A gets paid g(D1)
def
= fD1(D1) in expectation, whereas B’s expected cost
is g(D1). (Alternatively, a B agent of type 0 pays f0(D1) and a B agent of type 1 pays f1(D1).)
The full game. We now turn our attention to a more involved game. Here A, aiming to have
a more accurate posterior belief on B’s type, offers B a coupon. Agents of type t prefer a coupon
of type t. And so, B chooses what type to report A, who then gives B the coupon and afterwards
makes a prediction about B’s probability of being of type 1. The formal stages of the game are as
follows.
0. B’s type, t, is drawn randomly with Pr[t = 0] = D0 and Pr[t = 1] = D1.
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1. B reports to A a type tˆ = σB(t) and receives utility of ρt if indeed tˆ = t. We assume
throughout this section that ρ0 = ρ1 = ρ.
2. A reports a prediction x, representing Pr[t = 1 | σB(t) = tˆ], and receives a payment from B
of ft(x).
Theorem 3.1. Consider the coupon game with payments in the form of a symmetric proper scoring
rule and with the following added assumption about the value of the coupon: f1(D0)−f1(D1) < ρ <
f1(1) − f1(0) = f0(0) − f0(1). The unique BNE strategy of B in this game, denoted σ∗B, satisfies
that Pr[t = 0 | σ∗B(t) = 0] = Pr[t = 1 | σ∗B(t) = 1].
Note that a Randomized Response strategy σB for B would instead have Pr[σB(0) = 0] =
Pr[σB(1) = 1]. This condition is different from the condition in Theorem 3.1 when Pr[t = 0] 6=
Pr[t = 1] (i.e., D0 6= D1).
Proof. We first analyze both agents’ utilities and strategies. The utility of A is solely based on the
payments of the proper scoring rule: Et←{D0,D1}[ft(x)]. A has to decide on two potential reports:
x0 and x1, where for b ∈ {0, 1}, xb represents A’s belief about Pr[t = 1 | tˆ = b]. Therefore, a
strategy σA of A maps a signal tˆ into a report. The utility of B has two components — B gains
a certain amount of utility ρt from reporting A the true type, but then has to pay A her scoring
rule payments. Therefore a strategy σB maps each of B’s types to a signal. Given a strategy σB
we use the following notation:
p = Pr[σB(0) = 0], q = Pr[σB(1) = 1]
This way, B’s utility function takes the form
uB = D0uB,0 +D1uB,1
where uB,0 = p (ρ− f0(x0)) + (1− p) (−f0(x1))
uB,1 = q (ρ− f1(x1)) + (1− q) (−f1(x0))
When A sees the signal tˆ the probability over B’s type is given by Bayes Rule:
y0 = y0(p, q)
def
= Pr[t = 1 | tˆ = 0] = D1(1− q)
D0p+D1(1− q) =
1
1 + D0pD1(1−q)
(1)
y1 = y1(p, q)
def
= Pr[t = 1 | tˆ = 1] = D1q
D0(1− p) +D1q =
1
1 + D0(1−p)D1q
(2)
and since A’s payments come from a proper scoring rule it follows that A reports x0 = σA(0) = y0
and x1 = σA(1) = y1. In other words, given that B’s BNE strategy is (p
∗, q∗), then A plays
best-response of x∗0 = y0(p∗, q∗), x∗1 = y1(p∗, q∗).
We now turn to analyze B’s utility. Denote the strategy that A plays as x0 and x1. Then agent
B decides on p and q that maximize the utility function
uB = D0 · (p(ρ− f0(x0))− (1− p)f0(x1)) +D1 · (q(ρ− f1(x1))− (1− q)f1(x0))
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It is simple to characterize B’s best response to A’s strategy of (x0, x1).
If ρ > f0(x0)− f0(x1) then p = 1
If ρ < f0(x0)− f0(x1) then p = 0
If ρ = f0(x0)− f0(x1) then B may play any p ∈ [0, 1]
If ρ > f1(x1)− f1(x0) then q = 1
If ρ < f1(x1)− f1(x0) then q = 0
If ρ = f1(x1)− f1(x0) then B may play any q ∈ [0, 1] (3)
We now wish to characterize the game’s BNEs. First, we claim that in a BNE, with B playing
σ∗B = (p
∗, q∗), it cannot be that p∗ < 1 − q∗. This follows from the fact that y0(p, q) > y1(p, q) ⇔
p < 1− q. It means that A’s best response to such (p∗, q∗) is to answer some (x0, x1) s.t. x0 > x1.
But since f0 is a decreasing function, f1 is an increasing function and ρ > 0, then B’s best response
to such (x0, x1) is to deviate to (1, 1). Similarly, should (p
∗, q∗) be such that p∗ = 1 − q∗ and
both p∗, q∗ ∈ (0, 1), then A’s best response (x0, x1) is (12 , 12), which implies again that B prefers to
deviate to (1, 1). It follows that, with the exception of (1, 0) and (0, 1), any BNE strategy of B
satisfies p∗ > 1− q∗, and so any BNE strategy of A satisfies x0 < x1.
Before continuing with the proof we would like to make two observations, which we will re-
peatedly use. Let X be a uniform Bernoulli random variable. We examine the expected payment
to an expert reporting a belief of z as to the probability of the event X = 1, which we denote
as F1/2(z) =
1
2(f0(z) + f1(z)). The function F1/2 is a concave function with a unique maxi-
mum at z = 12 , and it is strictly increasing on the [0,
1
2 ] interval and strictly decreasing on [
1
2 , 1]
interval. Therefore, for any a there exists at most two distinct preimages z1 ≤ 12 ≤ z2 satisfy-
ing F1/2(z1) = F1/2(z2) = a. Recall that we assume (f0, f1) is a symmetric proper scoring rule
(so f1(z) = f0(1 − z) for any z ∈ [0, 1]). So our first observation is: for any z1, z2 satisfying
F1/2(z1) = F1/2(z2) and z2 > z1, we have that z2 = 1 − z1 with z1 ∈ [0, 1/2) and z2 ∈ (1/2, 1].
Using again the fact that (f0, f1) is a symmetry proper scoring rule and the fact that F1/2 is maxi-
mized at z = 12 , we make our second observation: for any z, z
′ satisfying F1/2(z) ≥ F1/2(z′) it must
hold that |z − 12 | ≤ |z′ − 12 |, which implies that z ∈ [z′, 1− z′] if z′ ≤ 1/2.
We now return to the proof of the theorem using case analysis as to the potential BNE strategies
of B. We will rely also on our assumption that D0 ≥ D1.
• (p∗, q∗) = (1, 1), i.e. B always plays tˆ = t. This means that A sets x0 = 0 and x1 = 1. (I.e.,
A always predicts t = b given the signal tˆ = b.)
(∗) We deduce that if ρ ≥ f0(0)− f0(1) and ρ ≥ f1(1)− f1(0), then the game has a BNE of
(x∗0, x
∗
1) = (0, 1), (p
∗, q∗) = (1, 1)
We comment that since (f0, f1) is a symmetric proper scoring rule, then we have that f0(0)−
f0(1) = f1(1)− f1(0).
• (p∗, q∗) = (1, 0), i.e. B only sends the tˆ = 0 signal. So when A sees the tˆ = 0 signal she sets
x0 = D1 just as in the benchmark yet. But A is indifferent as to the choice of x1 since the
tˆ = 1 signal is never sent. In order for this to be a BNE it must holds that f1(x1)− f1(D1) ≥
ρ ≥ f0(D1) − f0(x1) so that both types of B agent would keep sending the tˆ = 0 signal. So
x1 satisfies that F1/2(x1) =
1
2 (f0(x1) + f1(x1)) ≥ F1/2(D1) = 12 (f0(D1) + f1(D1)). Based on
15
our second observation, we have that x1 ∈ [D1, D0].
(∗) We deduce that if the parameters of the game are set such that there exists v ∈ [D1, D0]
satisfying both f0(v) ≥ f0(D1)− ρ and f1(v) ≥ f1(D1) + ρ then the game has a BNE of
(x∗0, x
∗
1) = (D1, v), (p
∗, q∗) = (1, 0)
As f1 is an increasing function, it must hold that ρ ≤ f1(D0)− f1(D1). In other words, when
ρ > f1(D0)− f1(D1) then this cannot be a BNE.
• (p∗, q∗) = (0, 1). This means that B only sends the tˆ = 1 signal. So now A sets x1 = D1
but A is indifferent regarding the value of x0. In order for B not to deviate from(0, 1) then
x0 should satisfy both ρ ≤ f0(x0) − f0(D1) and ρ ≥ f1(D1) − f1(x0). This implies that
F1/2(x0) ≥ F1/2(D1) and our second observation gives that x0 ∈ [D1, D0]. But observe that
f0(x0) ≥ ρ − f0(D1) > f0(D1). This contradicts the fact that f0 is a strictly decreasing
function.
• p∗ = 1 while q∗ ∈ (0, 1). This means A sets x1 = 1 (because only type 1 agents can send
tˆ = 1), while setting x0 = y0(p
∗, q∗) > 0. To keep B from deviating then x0 should satisfy that
ρ ≥ f0(x0)− f0(1) and ρ = f1(1)− f1(x0). Therefore F1/2(1) ≥ F1/2(x0), so our observation
yields the contradiction 1 ∈ [x0, 1− x0].
• q∗ = 1 while p∗ ∈ (0, 1). This case is symmetric to the previous case, and we get a similar
contradiction using F1/2(0) ≥ F1/2(x1).
• p∗, q∗ ∈ (0, 1) with p∗ > 1− q∗. We know that A’s best response is setting x∗0 = y0(p∗, q∗) and
x∗1 = y1(p∗, q∗) and we have already shown that y0 < y1. In order for B to play best response
against (y0, y1) we must have that ρ = f0(y0)−f0(y1) = f1(y1)−f1(y0) so F1/2(y0) = F1/2(y1).
Based on our first observation from before we have that y1 = 1− y0. In other words, B picks
p∗ and q∗ s.t. the signals tˆ = 0 and tˆ = 1 are symmetric:
Pr[t = 1 | tˆ = 1] = y1 = 1− y0
= 1−Pr[t = 1 | tˆ = 0] = Pr[t = 0 | tˆ = 0]
so regardless of the value of b, the expression Pr[t = tˆ | tˆ = b] is the same.
Observe that we have ρ = f0(y0) − f0(y1) = f0(y0) − f0(1 − y0) = −g′(y0) or ρ = g′(y1).
(Recall, (f0, f1) are derived using a convex function g as detailed in Section A.1.) In other
words, B sets (p∗, q∗) by first finding y1 ∈ (12 , 1] s.t. g′(y1) = ρ, then finding (p∗, q∗) that
satisfy Equation (5) and yield y1. Formally, B finds (p
∗, q∗) that satisfy
ρ = g′(
D1q
∗
D0(1− p∗) +D1q∗ ) = −g
′(
D1(1− q∗)
D0p∗ +D1(1− q∗)) (4)
Recall that g is convex and g′′ > 0 on the [0, 1] interval. This implies that as ρ increases, the
point y1(p
∗, q∗) gets further away from 12 and closer to 1.
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Recall that in order for B to play according to Randomized Response, B should set p∗ = q∗.
Yet, in this game, a rational agent B plays s.t. A’s posterior on B’s type is symmetric. Indeed,
1− y0 = y1 implies
D0p
∗
D0p∗ +D1(1− q∗) =
D1q
∗
D0(1− p∗) +D1q∗ ⇒ D
2
0p
∗(1− p∗) = D21q∗(1− q∗) (5)
and so, unless D0 = D1, we have that p
∗ 6= q∗.
Lastly, we comment about A’s payment. Using the notation of Equation (10), when tˆ = 0 then
A gets an expected payment of Fy0(y0) = g(y0), and when tˆ = 1 then A gets Fy1(y1) = g(y1). But
as y0 = 1− y1 and the scoring rule is symmetric, we have that A gets the same payment regardless
of the signal, so A’s payment is g(y1). Recall that y1 is the point where ρ = g
′(y1).
So, is this game worth while for A? Imagine that A could choose between either this coupon
game, or the “benchmark game” in which A guesses B’s type without viewing any signal from A.
Recall, in the benchmark game, A gets an expected profit of g(D1) = g(D0). Recall that g is a
convex function that is minimized at x = 12 . Therefore, g(y1) > g(D0) if
1
2 ≤ D0 < y1 which also
implies g′(D0) < g′(y1) = ρ. In other words, A gains more money than in the benchmark game
only if A offers a coupon of high-value.
The case with ρ0 6= ρ1. We briefly discuss the case where ρ0 and ρ1 are not equal. First of all,
observe that now there could be situations in which the BNE is of the form (1, q∗) with a non-
integral q∗, or the symmetric (p∗, 1). This is because the previous contradiction no longer holds.
More interestingly the BNE we get: (y0, y1) and (p
∗, q∗) still satifies Equations (1) and (2), and
also
ρ0 = f0(y0)− f0(y1) , ρ1 = f1(y1)− f1(y0)
which, using ρ0ρ1 can be manipulated into
ρ1
ρ0 + ρ1
f0(y0) +
ρ0
ρ0 + ρ1
f1(y0) =
ρ1
ρ0 + ρ1
f0(y1) +
ρ0
ρ0 + ρ1
f1(y1)
In otherwords, setting µ = ρ0ρ0+ρ1 , we have Fµ(y0) = Fµ(y1). Alternatively, it is possible to subtract
the two equalities and deduce:
1
2(ρ0 − ρ1) = 12(f0(y0) + f1(y0))− 12(f0(y0) + f1(y1)) = F1/2(y0)− F1/2(y1)
These two conditions (along with y0 < y1) dictate the value of y0, y1, and thus the values of (p
∗, q∗).
Sadly, it is no longer the case that y1 = 1− y0.
In Appendix A.2 we discusse the implications of using specific scoring rules.
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4 The Coupon Game with the Identity Payments
In this section, we examine a different variation of our initial game. As always, we assume that B
has a type sampled randomly from {0, 1} w.p. D0 and D1 respectively, and wlog D0 ≥ D1. Yet
this time, the payments between A and B are given in the form of a 2× 2 matrix we denote as M .
This payment matrix specifies the payment from B to A in case A “accuses” B of being of type
t˜ ∈ {0, 1} and B is of type t. In general we assume that A strictly gains from finding out B’s true
type and potentially loses otherwise (or conversely, that a B agent of type t strictly loses utility if
A accuses B of being of type t˜ = t and potentially gains money if A accuses B of being of type
t˜ = 1− t). In this section specifically, we consider one simple matrix M – the identity matrix I2×2.
Thus, A gets utility of 1 from correctly guessing B’s type (the same utility regardless of B’s type
being 0 or 1) and 0 utility if she errs.
4.1 The Game and Its Analysis
The benchmark game. The benchmark for this work is therefore a very simple “game” where
B does nothing, A guesses a type and B pays A according to M . It is clear that A maximizes
utility by guessing t˜ = 0 (since D0 ≥ D1) and so A gains in expectation D0; where an agent B of
type t = 0 pays 1 to A, and an agent B of type t = 1 pays 0 to A.
The full game. Aiming to get a better guess for the actual type of B, we now assume A first
offers B a coupon. As before, B gets a utility of ρt from a coupon of the right type and 0 utility
from a coupon of the wrong type. And so, the game takes the following form now.
0. B’s type, denoted t, is chosen randomly, with Pr[t = 0] = D0 and Pr[t = 1] = D1.
1. B reports a type tˆ = σB(t) to A. A in return gives B a coupon of type tˆ.
2. A accuses B of being of type t˜ = σA(tˆ) and B pays 1 to A if indeed t˜ = t.
And so, the utility of agent A is uA = 1[t˜=t]. The utility of agent B is a summation of two
factors – reporting the true type to get the right coupon and the loss of paying A for finding B’s
true type. So uB = ρt1[tˆ=t] − 1[t˜=t].
Theorem 4.1. In the coupon game with payments given by the identity matrix with ρ0 6= ρ1, any
BNE strategy of B is pure for at least one of the two types of B agent. Formally, for any BNE
strategy of B, denoted σ∗B, there exist t, tˆ ∈ {0, 1} s.t. Pr[σ∗B(t) = tˆ] = 1.
In the case where ρ0 = ρ1 then B has infinitely many randomized BNE strategies, including a
BNE strategy σ∗B s.t.
1
2 ≤ Pr[σ∗B(0) = 0] = Pr[σ∗B(1) = 1] < 1 (Randomized response).
Proof. First, we denote the strategies of agents A and B. We denote
For B: p = Pr[σB(0) = 0], and q = Pr[σB(1) = 1]
For A: x = Pr[σA(0) = 0], and y = Pr[σA(1) = 1]
Using these 4 parameters,we analyze the utility functions of the agents of the game. We start with
the utility function of A:
uA = D0px+D0(1− p)(1− y) +D1qy +D1(1− q)(1− x)
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Figure 2: The strategy space for agent B and the corresponding best response of A. When B
plays a (p, q)-point above line `1, then A sets x = 1; When B plays a (p, q)-point above line `2,
then A sets y = 1.
This function characterizes A’s best response strategy as follows. A determines x = Pr[σA(0) = 0]
based on the relation between D0p (= Pr[t = 0 ∧ tˆ = 0]) and D1(1− q) (= Pr[t = 1 ∧ tˆ = 0]) — if
D0p is the larger term, then x = 1; if D1(1− q) is the larger term, then x = 0; and if both are equal
then A is free to set any x ∈ [0, 1]. Similarly, the relationship between D1q = Pr[t = 1∧ tˆ = 1] and
D0(1− p) = Pr[t = 0 ∧ tˆ = 1] determines the value of y = Pr[σA(1) = 1].
We therefore denote the following two lines on the [0, 1]× [0, 1] square of possible choices for p
and q
`1 : q = 1− D0D1 p, (i.e., D0p = D1(1− q))
`2 : q =
D0
D1
(1− p), (i.e., D0(1− p) = D1q)
These are A’s “lines of indifference”: when B plays (p, q) ∈ `1 then A is indifferent to any value of
x in the range [0, 1], and when B plays (p, q) ∈ `2 then A is indifferent between any value of y.
Observe that `1 and `2 have the same slope, and so they are parallel, and that the point
(p, q) = (1, 0) is above `1 yet on `2. It follows that `2 is above `1 (unless D0 = D1 =
1
2 in which
case the two lines coincide). The two lines are shown in Figure 2.
We now turn our attention to the utility functions of B. The utility of B of type t = 0 is
uB,0 = p · (ρ0 − x) + (1− p)(−1 + y)
and the utility of B of type t = 1 is
uB,1 = q · (ρ1 − y) + (1− q)(−1 + x)
which means that B’s best response strategies are:
if ρ0 > x+ y − 1 then p = 1
if ρ0 < x+ y − 1 then p = 0
if ρ0 = x+ y − 1 then B can play any p ∈ [0, 1]
if ρ1 > x+ y − 1 then q = 1
if ρ1 < x+ y − 1 then q = 0
if ρ1 = x+ y − 1 then B can play any q ∈ [0, 1]
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Using the best response strategies of both A and B, we can analyze the game’s potential BNEs.
First we cover the simple case.
If max{ρ0, ρ1} > 1: then at least one coupon have value strictly greater than 1 and so one of
the two types of B agents strictly prefers deviating to playing deterministically. Wlog this type is
the t = 0 type, and so in any BNE of the game we have that Pr[σ∗B(0) = 0] = 1.
The interesting case is when max{ρ0, ρ1} ≤ 1 and since we assume ρ0 6= ρ1 then for some type
of B agent the value of the coupon is strictly < 1. (This intuitively makes sense — the coupon
game becomes interesting only when B’s value for the coupon is below the max-payment from B
to A, hence B has incentive to hide her true type.)
We continue with a case analysis as to the potential BNE strategies of B.
• Strictly above the `2 line, where D1q > D0(1− p).
This means B plays s.t. D1Pr[σ
∗
B(1) = 1] > D0Pr[σ
∗
B(0) = 1], and as a result
D1Pr[σ
∗
B(1) = 0] = D1 −D1q < D0 −D0(1− p) = D0Pr[σ∗B(0) = 0]
Therefore, given that A observes any signal tˆ ∈ {0, 1} it is more likely that a B agent of
type tˆ sent that this signal. So A responds to such strategy by playing deterministically
Pr[σ∗A(tˆ) = tˆ] = 1 for any signal tˆ ∈ {0, 1}. As A prefers to play x = y = 1 and some type of
B agent has coupon valuation < 1 then that type deviates (so either p = 0 or q = 0), and so
the BNE strategy of B cannot be above the `2 line.
• Strictly below the `2 line, where D1q < D0(1− p).
This means B plays s.t. D1Pr[σ
∗
B(1) = 1] < D0Pr[σ
∗
B(0) = 1]. So the tˆ = 1 signal is more
likely to come from a t = 0 type agent, and so A’s best response is to set (1−y) = Pr[σ∗A(1) =
0] = 1. We thus have that x + y − 1 ≤ 0 whereas ρ0, ρ1 > 0. Hence B deviates to playing
(p, q) = (1, 1), and so the BNE of B cannot be below the `2 line.
• On the `2 line, where D1q = D0(1− p).
This means B plays s.t. D1Pr[σ
∗
B(1) = 1] = D0Pr[σ
∗
B(0) = 1], and as a result
D1Pr[σ
∗
B(1) = 0] = D1 −D1q < D0 −D0(1− p) = D0Pr[σ∗B(0) = 0]
assuming D1 < D0 (the special case where D0 = D1 =
1
2 will be discussed later). And
so when A views the tˆ = 0 signal it is more likely that the type of B agent is t = 0 so
x = Pr[σ∗A(0) = 0] = 1; whereas when A views the tˆ = 1 signal both types of B agents are as
likely to send the signal, so A is indifferent as to the value of y = Pr[σ∗A(1) = 1].
Since ρ0 6= ρ1, then by setting the single parameter y, A can makes at most one of the two
types of B agent indifferent, while the other type plays a pure strategy. In other words, B’s
BNE strategy can only be one of the two extreme point: (p, q) = (1, 0) or (p, q) = (D0−D1D1 , 1).
The pure strategy of the non-indifferent type is determined by the relation between ρ0 ≷ ρ1.
So the possible BNEs are:
If ρ0 > ρ1, σ
∗
A = (1, y) with y ∈ [ρ1, ρ0], σ∗B = (1, 0)
If ρ0 = ρ1, σ
∗
A = (1, ρ0), σ
∗
B = (p, q) with (p, q) ∈ `2
If ρ0 < ρ1, σ
∗
A = (1, ρ0), σ
∗
B = (
D0−D1
D0
, 1)
In the special case where D0 = D1 (the two lines are the same one) then (p = 1, q = 0) and
(p = 0, q = 1) are both BNE regardless with A BNE strategy being any (x, y) satisfying with
min{ρ0, ρ1} ≤ x+ y − 1 ≤ max{ρ0, ρ1}.
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Observe that in the case with ρ0 = ρ1 < 1, in a BNE, B may play any strategy on the `2-line
and A makes both types of B agent indifferent to the value of p, q by setting y = ρ0 = ρ1. Since
the line p = q (i.e., agent B plays Randomized Response) does intersect the `2 line at (D0, D0), it
is possible that B plays Randomized Response (with  = ln(D0/D1)). (And if ρ0 = ρ1 = 1 then B
may play any (p, q) on `2 or above it whereas A plays x = y = 1.)
At the BNE, B plays in a way where the tˆ = 0 signal leads A to play the same way she plays in
the benchmark game (with no coupon) – to always play t˜ = 0, because Pr[t = 0 | tˆ = 0] > Pr[t =
1 | tˆ = 0]. However, given the signal tˆ = 1, it holds that Pr[t = 0 | tˆ = 1] = Pr[t = 1 | tˆ = 1]
(since B BNE strategy is on the `2 line). In other words, after viewing the tˆ = 1 signal, A has
posterior belief on B’s type of (12 ,
1
2). We comment that if B plays the strategy (1, 0), then this
last statement is vacuous since the tˆ = 1 signal is never sent.
Observe, when B plays any strategy on the `2 line, the utility that A gets from using the Nash-
strategy of (1, y) is D0p + D0(1 − p) = D0. In other words, moving from the benchmark game to
this more complicated coupon game gives A no additional revenue. In fact, the only agent that
gains anything is B. In the benchmark game B’s utility is −D0. In the coupon game, B’s utility
is D0(ρ0 − 1) when ρ0 ≥ ρ1, or D0(ρ0 − 1) +D1(ρ1 − ρ0) when ρ1 > ρ0.
4.2 Continuous Coupon Valuations
We now consider the same game with the same payments, but under a different setting. Whereas
before we assumed the valuations that the two types of B agents have for the coupon are fixed (and
known in advance), we now assume they are not fixed. In this section we assume the existence of a
continuous prior over ρ, where each type t ∈ {0, 1} has its own prior, so CDF0(x) def= Pr[ρ < x | t = 0]
with an analogous definition of CDF1(x). We use CDFB to denote the cumulative distribution
function of the prior over ρ (i.e., CDFB(x) = Pr[ρ < x] = D0CDF0(x) + D1CDF1(x)). We assume
the CDF is continuous and so Pr[ρ = y] = 0 for any y. Given any z ≥ 0 we denote CDF−1B (z) the
set {y : CDFB(y) = z}.
Theorem 4.2. In every BNE (σ∗A, σ
∗
B) of the coupon game with identity payments, where D0 6= D1
and the valuations of the B agents for the coupon are taken from a continuous distribution over
[0,∞), the BNE-strategies are as follows.
• Agent A always plays t˜ = 0 after viewing the tˆ = 0 signal (i.e., Pr[σ∗A(0) = 0] = 1); and plays
t˜ = 1 after viewing the tˆ = 1 signal with probability y∗ (i.e., Pr[σ∗A(1) = 1] = y
∗), where y∗ is
any value in CDF−1B (D1) when Pr[ρ < 1] ≥ D1 and y∗ = 1 when Pr[ρ < 1] < D1.
• Agent B reports truthfully (sends the signal tˆ = t) whenever her valuation for the coupon is
greater than y∗, and lies (sends the signal tˆ = 1− t) otherwise. That is, for every t ∈ {0, 1}
and ρ ∈ [0,∞), we have that if ρ > y∗ then Pr[σ∗B(t) = t] = 1 and if ρ < y∗ then Pr[σ∗B(t) =
t] = 0.
Proof. We assume B’s parameters are sampled as follows. First, we pick a type t s.t. Pr[t = 1] = D1
and Pr[t = 0] = D0. Then, given t we sample ρ← PDFt, where Pr[ρ ≤ 0] = 0 for both types. And
while A knows D0, D1,PDF0 and PDF1, A does not know B’s realized type and valuation.
We apply the same notation from before, denoting a strategy σB of B using p and q (where
p = Pr[σB(0) = 0] and q = Pr[σB(1) = 1]), and denoting a strategy σA of A using x and y (where
x = Pr[σA(0) = 0] and y = Pr[σA(1) = 1]).
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The utility function of B remains the same:
uB,0,ρ = p(ρ− x) + (1− p)(−1 + y) , uB,1,ρ = q(ρ− y) + (1− q)(−1 + x)
So B’s best response to any strategy of (x, y) of A is given by
σbrB (ρ, t) =
{
t, if ρ > x+ y − 1
1− t, if ρ < x+ y − 1
We call such a strategy a threshold strategy characterized by a parameter T , where any agent whose
ρ < T plays tˆ = 1 − t and any agent with ρ > T plays tˆ = t.4 Clearly, in any BNE, B follows a
threshold strategy for some value of T .
Therefore, since A’s BNE strategy is best response to B’s BNE strategy, it suffices to consider
A’s best response against a threshold strategy. Given that B follows a threshold strategy with
threshold T we have that A’s utility function is
uA = xD0(1− CDF0(T )) + (1− x)D1CDF1(T )
+yD1(1− CDF1(T )) + (1− y)D0CDF0(T )
= CDFB(T ) + x(D0 − CDFB(T )) + y(D1 − CDFB(T ))
where we use the notation CDFB = D0CDF0 + D1CDF1. As A maximizes her strategy, we have
that A sets x > 0 only if CDFB(T ) ≤ D0. Similarly, y > 0 only if CDFB(T ) ≤ D1. Since D1 ≤ D0
we only have three cases to consider.
• If CDFB(T ) < D1: In this case A’s best response is to set x = y = 1 and B’s best-response
to (1, 1) is to set the threshold parameter T = x+ y − 1 = 1. (So every B agent with ρ < 1
determinisitically sends the signal tˆ = 1 − t and any B agent with ρ > 1 sends the signal
tˆ = t.) Clearly, if it holds that CDFB(1) < D1, i.e., that the probability of a random B agent
to have ρ ≤ 1 is less than D1, then we have a BNE.
• If CDFB(T ) > D1: In this case A’s best response sets y = 0 and x ∈ [0, 1]. As B is playing best
response to A’s strategy then it means that the threshold parameter is set to T = x− 1 ≤ 0.
(And so all B agents have coupon valuation ρ > 0 we have that all B agents determinisitically
send the signal tˆ = t.) But for such T we have that CDFB(T ) ≤ CDFB(0) = 0 < D1 we get
an immediate contradiction.
• If CDFB(T ) = D1: In this case A sets x = 1 and is indifferent to the choice of y. Observe
that B’s best response to A’s strategy of (1, y) is to set the threshold parameter to T = y.
We have that this is indeed a BNE if y ∈ CDF−1B (D1). Assuming uniqueness to the inverse of
CDFB then σ
∗
A = (1, y
∗) with y∗ = CDF−1B (D1) is A’s BNE strategy, and B’s BNE strategy
is a threshold strategy with the threshold parameter set to T = y∗. We comment that in the
case where D0 = D1 and A is indifferent to the choice of x as well, the BNE strategy of A is
defined using any x∗, y∗ ∈ [0, 1] that satisfy x∗ + y∗ ∈ CDF−1B (D1).
4Since ρ is sampled from a continuous distribution, then the probability of the event ρ = T is 0.
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Observe that in this game, from A perspective, without knowing the realized value of ρ, it
appears that B is playing a randomized strategy. Furthermore, should the coupon valuation and
the type be chosen independently (i.e. PDF0 = PDF1) then A views B’s strategy as Randomized
Response — since for a randomly chosen ρ it holds that Pr[σ(ρ, 0) = 0] = Pr[σB(ρ, 1) = 1]. In
that case the behavior of B preserves -differential privacy for
 = ln
(
1− CDFB(y∗)
CDFB(y∗)
)
= ln
(
D0
D1
)
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5 The Coupon Game with an Opt Out Strategy
In this section, we consider a version of the game considered in Section 4. The revised version of
the game we consider here is very similar to the original game, except for A’s ability to “opt out”
and not guess B’s type.
In this section, we consider the most general form of matrix payments. We replace the identity-
matrix payments with general payment matrix M of the form M =
[
M0,0 −M0,1
−M1,0 M1,1
]
with the
(i, j) entry in M means A guessed t˜ = i and B’s true type is t = j, and so B pays A the amount
detailed in the (i, j)-entry. We assume M0,0,M0,1,M1,0,M1,1 are all non-negative.
Indeed, when previously considering the identity matrix payments, we assumed the for A,
realizing that B has type t = 0 is worth just as much as finding B has type t = 1. But it might be
the case that finding a person of t = 1 should be more worthwhile for A. For example, type t = 1
(the minority, since we always assume D0 ≥ D1) may represent having some embarrassing medical
condition while type t = 0 representing not having it. Therefore, M1,1 can be much larger than M0,0,
but similarly M1,0 is probably larger than M0,1. (Falsely accusing B of being of the embarrassing
type is costlier than falsely accusing a B of type 1 of belonging to the non-embarrassing majority.)
Our new payment matrix still motivates A to find out B’s true type — A gains utility by correctly
guessing B’s type, and loses utility by accusing B of being of the wrong type.
The “strawman” game. First, consider a simple game where B makes no move (A offers no
coupon) and A tries to guess B’s type without getting any signal from B. Then A has three possible
pure strategies: (i) guess that B is of type 0; (ii) guess that B is of type 1; and (iii) guess nothing.
In expectation, the outcome of option (i) is D0M0,0 − D1M0,1 and the outcome of option (ii) is
D1M1,1 − D0M1,0. If the parameters of M are set such that both options are negative then A’s
preferred strategy is to opt out and gain 0. We assume throughout this section that indeed the
above holds. (Intuitively, this assumption reflects the fact that we don’t make assumptions about
people’s type without first getting any information about them.) So we have
M0,0
M0,1
<
D1
D0
, and
M1,1
M1,0
<
D0
D1
(6)
A direct (and repeatedly used) corollary of Equation (6) is that
M0,0
M0,1
<
M1,0
M1,1
.
The full game. We now give the formal description of the game.
0. B’s type, denoted t, is chosen randomly, with Pr[t = 0] = D0 and Pr[t = 1] = D1.
1. B reports a type tˆ to A. A in return gives B a coupon of type tˆ.
2. A chooses whether to accuse B of being of a certain type, or opting out.
• If A opts out (denoted as t˜ = ⊥), then B pays A nothing.
• If A accuses B of being of type t˜ then: if t˜ = t then B pays Mt,t to A, and if t˜ = 1 − t
then B pays −M1−t,t to A (or A pays M1−t,t to B).
Introducing the option to opt out indeed changes significantly the BNE strategies of A and B.
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Case Condition A’s Strategy B’s strategy
No. (always: x1 = y0 = 0)
1 ρ0 ≥M0,0 +M1,0 and ρ1 ≥M0,1 +M1,1 (x0, y1) = (1, 1) (1, 1)
2 ρ0 ≤M0,0 and ρ0ρ1 ≤
M0,0
M0,1
(x0, y1) = (
ρ0
M0,0
, 0) P1 = (0, 1)
3 0 ≤ ρ0 −M0,0 ≤M1,0 (x0, y1) = (1, ρ0−M0,0M1,0 ) P2
ρ1M1,0 − ρ0M1,1 ≥M0,1M1,0 −M0,0M1,1
4 ρ1 ≤M1,1 and ρ0ρ1 ≥
M1,0
M1,1
(x0, y1) = (0,
ρ1
M1,1
) P3 = (1, 0)
5 0 ≤ ρ1 −M1,1 ≤M0,1 (x0, y1) = (ρ1−M1,1M0,1 , 1) P4
ρ0M0,1 − ρ1M0,0 ≥M0,1M1,0 −M0,0M1,1
6 0 ≤ ρ1M1,0 − ρ0M1,1 ≤M0,1M1,0 −M0,0M1,1 See below P5
0 ≤ ρ0M0,1 − ρ1M0,0 ≤M0,1M1,0 −M0,0M1,1
Table 1: The various conditions under which we characterize the BNEs of the
Game. We use the notation P2 = (1 − D1M1,1D0M1,0 , 1), P4 = (1, 1 −
D0M0,0
D1M0,1
), and P5 =(
D0D1M0,1M1,0−D21M0,1M1,1
D0D1M0,1M1,0−D0D1M0,0M1,1 ,
D0D1M0,1M1,0−D20M0,0M1,0
D0D1M0,1M1,0−D0D1M0,0M1,1
)
. The point P5 lies at the intersection
between two specific lines, and points P2 and P4 are the intersection points of each of those
lines with the (q = 1)-line and (p = 1)-line resp. In case 6, the strategy of A is given by
(x0, y1) =
1
M1,0M0,1−M0,0M1,1 (−M1,1ρ0 +M1,0ρ1,M0,1ρ0 −M0,0ρ1).
Theorem 5.1. If we have that D20M0,0M1,0 = D
2
1M0,1M1,1 and the parameters of the game satisfy
the following condition:
0 < ρ1M1,0 − ρ0M1,1 < M0,1M1,0 −M0,0M1,1
0 < ρ0M0,1 − ρ1M0,0 < M0,1M1,0 −M0,0M1,1 (7)
then the unique BNE strategy of B, denote σ∗B, is such that B plays Randomized Response:
1
2 ≤
Pr[σ∗B(0) = 0] = Pr[σ
∗
B(1) = 1] < 1.
Proving Theorem 5.1 is the goal of this section. The proof itself is deferred to the next section.
We give here, in Table 1 a summary of the various BNEs of this game. The six cases detailed in
Table 1 cover all possible settings of the game and they are also mutually exclusive (unless some
inequality holds as an equality). The notation in Table 1 is consistent with our notation in the
analysis of the game. A strategy σB of agent B is denoted as (p, q) and a strategy σA of agent A
is denoted as (x0, x1, y0, y1). Formally, we denote p = Pr[σB(0) = 0] and q = Pr[σB(1) = 1]; and
xb = Pr[σA(0) = b] and yb = Pr[σA(1) = b] for b ∈ {0, 1}. (So A’s opting out probabilities are
x⊥ = Pr[σA(0) = ⊥] = 1− x0 − x1 and y⊥ = Pr[σA(1) = ⊥] = 1− y0 − y1.)
The various conditions given in Table 1 are feasibility conditions. They guarantee that A is
able to find a strategy (x0, x1, y0, y1) ∈ [0, 1]4 that cause at least one of the two types of B agent to
be indifferent as to the signal she sends. Case 6, which is the case relevant to Theorem 5.1, can be
realized starting with any matrix M satisfying M0,0M1,1 < M0,1M1,0 (which is a necessary condition
derived from Equation (6)), which intuitively can be interpreted as having a wrong “accusation”
being costlier than the gain from a correct “accusation” (on average and in absolute terms). Given
such M , one can set D0 and D1 s.t.
D0
D1
=
√
M0,1
M0,0
· M1,1M1,0 as to satisfy Equation (6). This can be
interpreted as balancing the “significance” of type 0 (i.e. M0,0M0,1) with the “significance” of type
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1 (i.e. M1,0M1,1), setting the more significant type as the less probable (i.e. if type 1 is more
significant than type 0, than D1 < D0). We then pick ρ0, ρ1 that satisfy
M1,1
M1,0
< ρ1ρ0 <
M0,1
M0,0
and
scale both by the sufficiently small multiplicative factor so we satisfy the other inequality of case
6. (In particular, setting ρ1ρ0 =
D0
D1
is a feasible solution.) Here, ρ0 and ρ1 are set such that the ratio
ρ1
ρ0
balances the significance ratio w.r.t type 1 accusation (i.e. ρ1ρ0 >
M1,1
M0,0
) and the ratio ρ0ρ1 balances
the significance ratio w.r.t to type 0 accusation (i.e. ρ0ρ1 >
M0,0
M1,0
). More concretely, for any matrix
M =
(
1 c
c d
)
with parameters c, d satisfying d < c2, we can set D0D1 =
√
d and any sufficiently
small ρ0, ρ1 satisfying
ρ1
ρ0
∈ (dc , c) and satisfy the requirements of Theorem 5.1.
Recall, in addition to the conditions specifically stated in Case 6 in Table 1, we also require that
D20M0,0M1,0 = D
2
1M0,1M1,1 in order for the two types of agent B to play Randomized Response.
In other words, this condition implies that B’s BNE strategy, represented by the point
P5 =
( D0D1M0,1M1,0 −D21M0,1M1,1
D0D1M0,1M1,0 −D0D1M0,0M1,1 ,
D0D1M0,1M1,0 −D20M0,0M1,0
D0D1M0,1M1,0 −D0D1M0,0M1,1
)
lies on the p = q line. And so, in this case the B agent plays a Randomized Response strategy
that preserves -differential privacy for  = ln( p1−q ) = ln
(
D1M0,1
D0M0,0
)
. Observe that this value of 
is independent from the value of the coupon (i.e., from ρ0 and ρ1). This is due to the nature of
BNE in which an agent plays her Nash-strategy in order to make her opponent indifferent between
various strategies rather than maximizing her own utility. Therefore, the coordinates of P5 are
such that they make agent A indifferent between opting out and playing x0 = 1 (or opting out and
y1 = 1). Since the utility function of A is independent of ρ0, ρ1, we have that perturbing the values
of ρ0, ρ1 does not affect the coordinates of P5. (Yet, perturbing the values of ρ0, ρ1 does affect the
various relations between the parameters of the game, and so it may determine which of the 6 cases
in Table 1 holds.)
5.1 Proof of Theorem 5.1: Finding a BNE Strategy for B
Recall, we assume Pr[t = 0] = D0 and Pr[t = 1] = D1 where wlog D0 ≥ D1. As we did before,
we denote B’s strategy σB using p = Pr[σB(0) = 0] and q = Pr[σB(1) = 1]. In contrast to the
previous analysis, now A has to decide between 3 alternatives per tˆ signal, so A has 6 options.
However, seeing as A’s choice to opt-out always give A a utility of 0, we just denote 4 alternatives:
x0 = Pr[σA(0) = 0], x1 = Pr[σA(0) = 1]
y0 = Pr[σA(1) = 0], y1 = Pr[σA(1) = 1]
and we constrain x0 + x1 ≤ 1 and y0 + y1 ≤ 1.5
Now, given that A views a signal tˆ, she has 3 alternatives:
5Whereas in the previous section we constrained x0 + x1 = 1 and y0 + y1 = 1.
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• Accuse B of being of type 0 and get an expected revenue of
M0,0Pr[t = 0 | tˆ]−M0,1Pr[t = 1 | tˆ]
=
1
Pr[tˆ]
(
M0,0Pr[t = 0]Pr[σB(0) = tˆ]−M0,1Pr[t = 1]Pr[σB(1) = tˆ]
)
=
1
Pr[tˆ]
(
M0,0D0Pr[σB(0) = tˆ]−M0,1D1Pr[σB(1) = tˆ]
)
• Accuse B of being of type 1 and get an expected revenue of
M1,1Pr[t = 1 | tˆ]−M1,0Pr[t = 0 | tˆ]
=
1
Pr[tˆ]
(
M1,1Pr[t = 1]Pr[σB(1) = tˆ]−M1,0Pr[t = 0]Pr[σB(0) = tˆ]
)
=
1
Pr[tˆ]
(
M1,1D1Pr[σB(1) = tˆ]−M1,0D0Pr[σB(0) = tˆ]
)
• Opt out and get revenue of 0 = 0
Pr[tˆ]
.
This means that A prefers accusing B of being of type 0 to opting out when
Pr[σB(0) = tˆ] >
M0,1D1
M0,0D0
Pr[σB(1) = tˆ]
Similarly, A prefers accusing B of being of type 1 to opting out when
Pr[σB(0) = tˆ] <
M1,1D1
M1,0D0
Pr[σB(1) = tˆ]
From Equation (6) we have that
M1,1D1
M1,0D0
< 1 <
M0,1D1
M0,0D0
. Therefore, given that Pr[tˆ] > 0, then A’s
best response is determined by the ratio:
Pr[σB(0) = tˆ]
Pr[σB(1) = tˆ]

<
M1,1D1
M1,0D0
, A plays Pr[σA(tˆ) = 1] = 1
=
M1,1D1
M1,0D0
, A is indifferent between ⊥ and playing t˜ = 1
∈ (M1,1D1M1,0D0 ,
M0,1D1
M0,0D0
) A plays Pr[σA(tˆ) = ⊥] = 1
=
M0,1D1
M0,0D0
, A is indifferent between ⊥ and playing t˜ = 0
>
M0,1D1
M0,0D0
A plays Pr[σA(tˆ) = 0] = 1
Therefore A’s BNE strategy when viewing the signal tˆ (which is best response to B’s BNE strategy)
is such that A never plays both t˜ = tˆ and t˜ = 1− tˆ with non-zero probability.
Switching to the B agent, the utility functions of B are similar to before:
For type t = 0 : UB,0 = p(ρ0 − x0M0,0 + x1M1,0) + (1− p)(−y0M0,0 + y1M1,0)
For type t = 1 : UB,1 = q(ρ1 − y1M1,1 + y0M0,1) + (1− q)(−x1M1,1 + x0M0,1)
and so p = 1 if ρ0 > M0,0(x0− y0)−M1,0(x1− y1) and p = 0 if ρ0 < M0,0(x0− y0)−M1,0(x1− y1);
similarly q = 1 if ρ1 > M1,1(y1−x1)−M0,1(y0−x0) and q = 0 if ρ1 < M1,1(y1−x1)−M0,1(y0−x0).
We can now make our first claim about the BNE of the game.
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Claim 5.2. In any BNE strategy of B we have that either
p
1− q =
Pr[σ∗B(0) = 0]
Pr[σ∗B(1) = 0]
≥ M0,1D1
M0,0D0
or
1− p
q
=
Pr[σ∗B(0) = 1]
Pr[σ∗B(1) = 1]
≤ M1,1D1
M1,0D0
Proof. Assume for the same of contradiction that both conditions do not hold. Then given the
tˆ = 0 signal it holds that x0 = Pr[σ
∗
A(0) = 0] = 0, and given the tˆ = 1 signal it holds that
y1 = Pr[σ
∗
A(1) = 1] = 0. Thus, B’s best response to A’s strategy is to switch to (p, q) = (1, 1)
(since ρ0, ρ1 > 0) and now both conditions do hold.
Claim 5.3. In any BNE strategy of B we have that both
p
1− q =
Pr[σ∗B(0) = 0]
Pr[σ∗B(1) = 0]
>
M1,1D1
M1,0D0
and
1− p
q
=
Pr[σ∗B(0) = 1]
Pr[σ∗B(1) = 1]
<
M0,1D1
M0,0D0
Proof. Based on the previous claim, one of the two inequalities is immediate. Assume we have
p
1−q ≥ M0,1D1M0,0D0 > 1 >
M1,1D1
M1,0D0
, we now show that 1−pq <
M0,1D1
M0,0D0
must also hold. If, for contradiction,
we have that 1−pq ≥ M0,1D1M0,0D0 then
1 = p+ (1− p) ≥ M0,1D1
M0,0D0
(
q + (1− q)) = M0,1D1
M0,0D0
which contradicts Equation (6). The argument for the case 1−pq ≤ M1,1D1M1,0D0 is symmetric.
Based on the last claim and on A’s best-response analysis, we have that in any BNE strategy
of A it holds that x1 = Pr[σ
∗
A(0) = 1] = 0 and y0 = Pr[σ
∗
A(1) = 0] = 0. (I.e., given the signal
tˆ then A never plays t˜ = 1 − tˆ.) As a result, B’s best response analysis simplifies to: p = 1 if
ρ0 > M0,0x0 +M1,0y1 and p = 0 if ρ0 < M0,0x0 +M1,0y1; similarly q = 1 if ρ1 > M1,1y1 +M0,1x0
and q = 0 if ρ1 < M1,1y1 +M0,1x0.
We are now able to prove the existence of a BNE as specified Theorem 5.1.
Claim 5.4. Assume that 0 ≤ ρ1M1,0− ρ0M1,1 ≤M0,1M1,0−M0,0M1,1 and 0 ≤ ρ0M0,1− ρ1M0,0 ≤
M0,1M1,0 −M0,0M1,1. The strategies σ∗A and σ∗B denoted below are BNE strategies.
For A :x∗0 = Pr[σ
∗
A(0) = 0] =
M1,0ρ1 −M1,1ρ0
M1,0M0,1 −M0,0M1,1
x∗1 = Pr[σ
∗
A(0) = 1] = 0
y∗0 = Pr[σ
∗
A(1) = 0] = 0
y∗1 = Pr[σ
∗
A(1) = 1] =
M0,1ρ0 −M0,0ρ1
M1,0M0,1 −M0,0M1,1
For B :p∗ = Pr[σ∗B(0) = 0] =
D1M0,1(D0M1,0 −D1M1,1)
D0D1M0,1M1,0 −D0D1M0,0M1,1
1− p∗ = Pr[σ∗B(0) = 1] =
D1M1,1(D1M0,1 −D0M0,0)
D0D1M0,1M1,0 −D0D1M0,0M1,1
1− q∗ = Pr[σ∗B(1) = 0] =
D0M0,0(D0M1,0 −D1M1,1)
D0D1M0,1M1,0 −D0D1M0,0M1,1
q∗ = Pr[σ∗B(1) = 1] =
D0M1,0(D1M0,1 −D0M0,0)
D0D1M0,1M1,0 −D0D1M0,0M1,1
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Proof. First, observe that under the given assumptions in the claim it holds that x∗0, y∗1 ∈ [0, 1], and
due to Equation (6) it holds that p∗, q∗, 1− p∗, 1− q∗ are all strictly positive (so p∗, q∗ ∈ (0, 1)).
Now observe that when B follows σ∗B then A has no incentive to deviate since
p∗
1−q∗ =
M0,1D1
M0,0D0
and 1−p
∗
q∗ =
M1,1D1
M1,0D0
. When A follows σ∗A then B has no incentive to deviate since
M0,0x
∗
0 +M1,0y
∗
1 =
M1,0M0,1ρ0 −M0,0M1,1ρ0
M1,0M0,1 −M0,0M1,1 = ρ0
M0,1x
∗
0 +M1,1y
∗
1 =
M0,1M1,0ρ1 −M1,1M0,0ρ1
M1,0M0,1 −M0,0M1,1 = ρ1
Observe that when D20M0,0M1,0 = D
2
1M0,1M1,1 then p
∗ = q∗. Furthermore, in this case we have
that p∗ > 12 because
2D0D1M0,1M1,0 − 2D21M0,1M1,1 > D0D1M0,1M1,0 −D0D1M0,0M1,1
⇔ D0D1M0,1M1,0 −D21M0,1M1,1 > D20M0,0M1,0 −D0D1M0,0M1,1
⇔ D1M0,1(D0M1,0 −D1M1,1) > D0M0,0(D0M1,0 −D1M1,1)
⇔ 0 > −D1M0,1 +D0M0,0
where the last derivation and the last inequality are both true because of Equation (6). This
concludes the existence part of Theorem 5.1. The more complicated part is to show that B’s BNE
strategy is unique. We make the following argument.
Theorem 5.5. Assume that 0 < ρ1M1,0−ρ0M1,1 < M0,1M1,0−M0,0M1,1 and 0 < ρ0M0,1−ρ1M0,0 <
M0,1M1,0 −M0,0M1,1. Then in all BNEs of the game both types of B agent play a mixed strategy.
Assuming Theorem 5.5 holds and using our above best-responsse analysis the uniqueness of the
BNE of Theorem 5.1 is immediate. If both p and q are non-integral then it must hold that x∗0 and
y∗1, since this is the unique solution to the system of two linear equations in two variables that set
both types of B agent indifferent. Under the assumption of Theorem 5.5 we have that both x∗0
and y∗1 are non-integral as well. This means that B plays (p, q) s.t. A is indifferent to the value
of x∗0, y∗1; i.e. p = (1 − q)M0,1D1M0,0D0 and 1 − p = q
M1,1D1
M1,0D0
. Again, since this is a linear system in two
variables, there exists a unique (p, q) pair that satisfy this condition, which is given by (p∗, q∗).
In the rest of this section (following t, our goal is to prove the Theorem 5.5. In fact, we give
a full analysis of all the points (p, q) that may be B’s BNE strategy, and for each such possible
(p, q) we analyze the conditions over the parameters of the game underwhich it is a BNE strategy
for B. The analysis is fairly long and tedious, as it involves checking feasibility constraints over
the 6 parameters of the game: ρ0, ρ1, M0,0, M0,1, M1,0 and M1,1. Furthermore, after deriving the
suitable feasibility constraints, we show that they cover all settings of the parameters of the game
and are mutually exclusive (when inequalities are strict).
5.2 Proof of Theorem 5.1: Characterizing All Potential BNEs of the Game
Consider the space [0, 1] × [0, 1] of all possible strategies (p, q) for the two types of B agents. We
denote the two “lines of indifference” for A on this square:
l1 : p =
M0,1D1
M0,0D0
(1− q)
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Figure 3: The 4 regions created by the lines l1 and l2, and the 5 intersection points of the two lines and the
borders of the squares.
l2 : 1− p = M1,1D1M0,1D1 q
where (p, q) = (0, 1) ∈ l1 and (p, q) = (1, 0) ∈ l2. These lines partition the [0, 1]× [0, 1] square into
multiple different regions, as shown in Figure 3).
First, we argue that any (p, q) in the lower region, below l1 and l2 (the shaded blue region in
Figure 3) cannot be B’s strategy in a BNE. We in fact already shown this: for any (p, q) in this
blue region we have that p1−q <
M0,1D1
M0,0D0
and 1−pq <
M1,1D1
M0,1D1
, contradicting our earlier claim.
Secondly, we argue that a point (p, q) above both lines is B’s strategy in a BNE is if the valuation
of B for the coupons is high. Observe, for any (p, q) above the line, A’s best response is to set
x0 = y1 = 1, which means B’s utility is p(ρ0 −M0,0) + (1 − p)M1,0 for agents of type t = 0, and
q(ρ1−M1,1) + (1− q)M0,1 for type t = 1. Therefore, B has no incentive to deviate from (p, q) only
if ρ0 ≥M0,0 +M1,0 and ρ1 ≥M0,1 +M1,1. In particular, when both inequalities are strict, we have
that (1, 1) is B’s BNE; when both are equalities, any point above both l1 and l2 is a BNE; and
when one is an equality and the other is a strict inequality, we have that the BNE strategy is on
the border of the [0, 1]× [0, 1] square.
We now turn our attention to the points strictly between the lines l1 and l2 (excluding all points
on these lines). To any (p, q) in these regions, A’s best response is to play t˜ = tˆ when seeing one
signal and to opt-out when seeing the other signal. E.g., for any (p, q) above l1 but below l2 (the
top-left region), A opts out when seeing the tˆ = 1 signal, but play t˜ = 0 when seeing the tˆ = 0
signal. In that case, B’s utility function is p(ρ0 −M0,0) for type t = 0, and qρ1 + (1 − q)M0,1for
type t = 1. Therefore, unless ρ0 = M0,0, agents of type t = 0 have incentive to deviate (either to
playing p = 0 or p = 1). In addition, it must also hold that ρ1 ≥M0,1. (If this inequality is strict,
then the BNE strategy lies on the border of the square.) Analogously, should the BNE strategy lie
above the l2 line but below the l1 line (lower-right area), then it must be the case that ρ1 = M1,1
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and ρ0 ≥M1,0.
We now consider points on the l1 and l2, excluding the 5 intersection points we have with either
the two lines, or any of the lines intersection with the p = 1 line or the q = 1 line.
• For any (p, q) on the l1 line below the l2 line (top-left side of l1 bordering the blue region):
A’s best response to any such (p, q) is to set y0 = y1 = 0 and x1 = 0. It follows that B’s
utility is p(ρ0 − x0M0,0) and qρ1 + (1 − q)x0M0,1 for types t = 0 and t = 1 resp. Hence, if
0 ≤ ρ0M0,0 =
ρ1
M0,1
≤ 1 then such strategies can be BNE
• For any (p, q) on the l1 line above the l2 line (bottom-right side of l1 bordering the red
region): A’s best response to such (p, q) is to set x1 = y0 = 0, y1 = 1; B’s utility functions
are p(ρ0 − x0M0,0) + (1− p)M1,0 and q(ρ1 −M1,1) + (1− q)x0M0,1 for types t = 0 and t = 1
resp. It follows that if 0 ≤ ρ0−M1,0M0,0 =
ρ1−M1,1
M0,1
≤ 1, then such point give a BNE
• For any (p, q) on the l2 line below the l1 line (bottom-right side of l2 bordering the blue
region): As a response to any (p, q) here, A sets x0 = x1 = 0 and y0 = 0. B’s utility function
is therefore pρ0 + (1 − p)(y1M1,0) and q(ρ1 − y1M1,1). Hence, in case 0 ≤ ρ0M1,0 =
ρ1
M1,1
≤ 1,
we have a BNE with such (p, q).
• For any (p, q) on the l2 line above the l1 line (top-left side of l2 bordering the red region):
As best response to such (p, q), A sets x1 = y0 = 1 and x0 = 1. And so B’s utility functions
are p(ρ0 −M0,0) + (1 − p)y1M1,0 and q(ρ1 − y1M1,1 + (1 − q)M0,1. Therefore, if we have
0 ≤ ρ0−M0,0M1,0 =
ρ1−M0,1
M1,1
≤ 1 then we have a BNE with such (p, q).
Thus far (with the exception of the potential BNE at the point (p, q) = (1, 1)) we have considered
only BNE that may arise only when the parameters of the game (ρ0, ρ1 and the entries of M) satisfy
some equality constraints. Assuming we perturb the values of ρ0 and ρ1 a little such that none of
the above-mentioned equalities hold, we are left with 5 points on which the BNE can occur:
P1 = (0, 1) , P2 = (1− D1M1,1
D0M1,0
, 1) , P3 = (1, 0) , P4 = (1, 1− D0M0,0
D1M0,1
)
P5 =
(
D0D1M0,1M1,0 −D21M0,1M1,1
D0D1M0,1M1,0 −D0D1M0,0M1,1 ,
D0D1M0,1M1,0 −D20M0,0M1,0
D0D1M0,1M1,0 −D0D1M0,0M1,1
)
We traverse them one by one. We remind the reader that since
M0,1
M0,0
> D0D1 >
M1,1
M1,0
then M0,0M1,1 <
M0,1M1,0. We repeatedly use this inequality in the analysis below.
5.2.1 Conditions under which B’s BNE strategy is P1.
Observe that in this case B never sends the tˆ = 0 signal. A’s best response in naturally to opt-out,
but A still commits to a certain values of x0 and x1 (to prevent B from deviating from the (0, 1)
strategy). B’s utility functions are
For t = 0 : p(ρ0 − x0M0,0 + x1M1,0)
For t = 1 : qρ1 + (1− q)(x0M0,1 − x1M1,1)
So A should set x0 and x1 s.t. ρ0 ≤ x0M0,0 − x1M1,0 and ρ1 ≥ x0M0,1 − x1M1,1.
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Proposition 5.6. There exist x0, x1 ∈ [0, 1] satisfying both ρ0 ≤ x0M0,0 − x1M1,0 and ρ1 ≥
x0M0,1 − x1M1,1 iff ρ0 ≤M0,0 and ρ0M0,1 ≤ ρ1M0,0.
Proof. To see that these conditions are sufficient, assume that ρ0 ≤ M0,0 and ρ0M0,1 ≤ ρ1M0,0.
Then we can set x0 =
ρ0
M0,0
and x1 = 0. Clearly, both lie on the [0, 1]-interval. We can check and
see that indeed ρ0 ≤ ρ0M0,0M0,0 − 0 ·M1,0 and ρ1 ≥
ρ0
M0,0
M0,1 − 0 ·M1,1.
We now show these conditions are necessary. Suppose that ρ0 > M0,0, then observe that any
x0, x1 satisfying the two constraints must satisfy 0 ≤ x1M1,0 ≤ x0M0,0 − ρ0, so x0 ≥ ρ0M0,0 . As a
result of our assumption, we have that x0 > 1. Contradiction.
So assume now that ρ0 ≤ M0,0 yet ρ0M0,1 > ρ1M0,0. Any x0, x1 satisfying the two constraints
must also satisfy
x0
M0,1
M1,1
− ρ1M1,1 ≤ x1 ≤ x0
M0,0
M1,0
− ρ0M1,0
which, using our assumption, yields
x0
M0,1M1,0−M0,0M1,1
M1,1M1,0
≤ ρ1M1,1 −
ρ0
M1,0
< ρ0
(
M0,1
M0,0M1,1
− 1M1,0
)
= ρ0
M1,0M0,1−M0,0M1,1
M0,0M1,0M1,1
so we have x0 <
ρ0
M0,0
. Contradiction.
5.2.2 Conditions under which B’s BNE strategy is P2.
As a response to this strategy, A’s best response is to set x1 = y0 = 0 and x0 = 1, while y1 is to be
determined. So B’s utility functions are
For t = 0 : p(ρ0 −M0,0) + (1− p)y1M1,0
For t = 1 : q(ρ1 − y1M1,1) + (1− q)M0,1
Therefore, in order for B to not have any incentive to deviate, A should set y1 s.t ρ0−M0,0 = y1M1,0
and ρ1 − y1M1,1 ≥M0,1.
Proposition 5.7. There exists a y1 ∈ [0, 1] satisfying both ρ0 −M0,0 = y1M1,0 and ρ1 − y1M1,1 ≥
M0,1 iff M0,0 ≤ ρ0 ≤M0,0 +M1,0 and (ρ0 −M0,0)M1,1 ≤ (ρ1 −M0,1)M1,0.
Proof. Clearly, the only y1 that can satisfy both constraints is y1 =
ρ0−M0,0
M1,0
, and we therefore must
have that M0,0 ≤ ρ0 ≤M0,0 +M1,0. We also need to verify that indeed the inequality holds in the
right direction. I.e., to have (ρ0−M0,0)M1,1M1,0 ≤ ρ1−M0,1. Clearly, if those two conditions hold then
y1 defined as above satisfy the required.
Observation 5.8. If we have that (ρ0 −M0,0)M1,1 ≤ (ρ1 −M0,1)M1,0 then also ρ0ρ1 <
M1,0
M1,1
.
Proof. ρ0M1,1 −M0,0M1,1 ≤ ρ1M1,0 −M0,1M1,0 < ρ1M1,0 −M0,0M1,1 ⇒ ρ0M1,1 < ρ1M1,0.
5.2.3 Conditions under which B’s BNE strategy is P3.
Should B play (1, 0), then we have that A only sees the tˆ = 0 signal and always opts out (i.e.
x0 = x1 = 0). However, in order to prevent B from deviating, A needs to commit to a y0, y1 that
leave B preferring not to deviate from (1, 0). B’s utility functions are
For t = 0 : pρ0 + (1− p)(−y0M0,0 + y1M1,0)
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For t = 1 : q(ρ1 + y0M0,1 − y1M1,1)
Therefore, in order for B to not have any incentive to deviate, A should set y0, y1 s.t ρ0 ≥ −y0M0,0+
y1M1,0 and ρ1 + y0M0,1 − y1M1,1 ≤ 0.
Proposition 5.9. There exist y0, y1 ∈ [0, 1] satisfying both ρ0 ≥ −y0M0,0 + y1M1,0 and ρ1 ≤
−y0M0,1 + y1M1,1 iff ρ1 ≤M1,1 and ρ0M1,1 ≥ ρ1M1,0.
The proof is completely analogous to the proof of Proposition 5.6.
5.2.4 Conditions under which B’s BNE strategy is P4.
As a response to this strategy, A’s best response is to set x1 = y0 = 0 and y1 = 1, while x0 is to be
determined. So B’s utility functions are
For t = 0 : p(ρ0 − x0M0,0) + (1− p)M1,0
For t = 1 : q(ρ1 −M1,1) + (1− q)x0M0,1
Therefore, in order for B to not have any incentive to deviate, A should set x0 s.t ρ0−x0M0,0 ≥M1,0
and ρ1 −M1,1 = x0M0,1.
Proposition 5.10. There exists a x0 ∈ [0, 1] satisfying both ρ0 − x0M0,0 ≥ M1,0 and ρ1 −M1,1 =
x0M0,1 iff M1,1 ≤ ρ1 ≤M1,1 +M0,1 and (ρ1 −M1,1)M0,0 ≤ (ρ0 −M1,0)M0,1.
The proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 5.7.
5.2.5 Conditions under which B’s BNE strategy is P5.
As this point lies on the intersection of l1 and l2, then A’s best response to this strategy is to set
x1 = y0 = 0. Thus,B’s utility functions are
For t = 0 : p(ρ0 − x0M0,0) + (1− p)y1M1,0
For t = 1 : q(ρ1 − y1M1,1) + (1− q)x0M0,1
It is therefore up to A to pick x0 and y1 that satisfy both equalities
(
ρ0
ρ1
)
=
(
M0,0 M1,0
M0,1 M1,1
)(
x0
y1
)
Cramer’s formula give that the solution to this system is(
x0
y1
)
=
1
M1,0M0,1 −M0,0M1,1
(−M1,1 M1,0
M0,1 −M0,0
)(
ρ0
ρ1
)
(8)
In order for x0, y1 to be in the range [0, 1], we therefore must have that: (i) ρ0M1,1 ≤ ρ1M1,0, (ii)
(ρ1−M0,1)M1,0 ≤ (ρ0−M0,0)M1,1, (iii) ρ1M0,0 ≤ ρ0M0,1, and (iv) (ρ0−M1,0)M0,1 ≤ (ρ1−M1,1)M0,0.
In other words:
0 ≤ ρ1M1,0 − ρ0M1,1 ≤M0,1M1,0 −M0,0M1,1
0 ≤ ρ0M0,1 − ρ1M0,0 ≤M0,1M1,0 −M0,0M1,1 (9)
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5.2.6 Summarizing.
Table 1 summarized the 6 conditions under which each point is a BNE. It is easy to verify that the
condition of Theorem 5.5 is precisely condition 6, underwhich B’s BNE strategy unique (the point
P5) and it is mixed.
5.3 Proof of Theorem 5.1: The Uniqueness of B’s BNE Strategy
So far we have introduced conditions for the existence of various BNEs. In this section, our goal
is to show that the above analysis gives a complete description of the game. That is, to show that
the cases detailed in Table 1 span all potential values the parameters of the game may take, and
furthermore (modulo cases of equality between parameters) they are also mutually exclusive.
Lemma 5.11. Assume that the parameters of the game (i.e. ρ0, ρ1 and the entries of M) satisfy
one of the 6 conditions detailed in Table 1 with strict inequalities. Then no other condition in
Table 1 holds simultaneously. In other words, the conditions in Table 1 are mutually exclusive
(excluding equalities). As the conditions are mutually exclusive it means that under the condition
specified in Theorem 5.5, the game has a unique BNE – as specified by case 6 in Table 1.
Proof. We traverse the 6 cases, showing that if case i holds with strict inequalties then some other
case j > i cannot hold.
Case 1. Clearly, if the conditions of case 1 hold, then the conditions of cases 2, 3, 4 and 5 can-
not hold. To see that the conditions of case 6 cannot hold, we argue that the condi-
tion max{ρ1M1,0 − ρ0M1,1, ρ0M0,1 − ρ1M0,0} ≤ M0,1M1,0 − M0,0M1,1 implies that both
ρ0 ≤M0,0 +M1,0 and ρ1 ≤M0,1 +M1,1. This claim follows from the inequalities
ρ0(M0,1M1,0 −M0,0M1,1) = M0,0(ρ1M1,0 − ρ0M1,1) +M1,0(ρ0M0,1 − ρ1M0,0)
≤ (M0,0 +M1,0)(M0,1M1,0 −M0,0M1,1)
ρ1(M0,1M1,0 −M0,0M1,1) = M0,1(ρ1M1,0 − ρ0M1,1) +M1,1(ρ0M0,1 − ρ1M0,0)
≤ (M0,1 +M1,1)(M0,1M1,0 −M0,0M1,1)
Case 2. Clearly, the conditions of case 2 cannot hold simultaneously with the conditions of cases
4 and 6. To exclude the other cases, observe that using our favorite inequality
M0,0
M0,1
<
M1,0
M1,1
,
we have that the condition ρ0ρ1 ≤
M0,0
M0,1
implies that ρ0ρ1 <
M1,0
M1,1
. Hence case 3 cannot hold, and
neither does case 5 (using again the fact that M0,1M1,0 > M0,0M1,1).
Case 3. This case is symmetric to case 2 — since M0,1M1,0 −M0,0M1,1 > 0 then case 3 rules out
case 4 (and the fact it cannot hold simultaneously with cases 5 and 6 is obvious).
Case 4. Clearly, case 6 cannot hold together with case 4. To show that case 5 cannot hold too,
we claim that if both ρ1M1,0 − ρ0M1,1 ≥ M0,1M1,0 − M0,0M1,1 and ρ0M0,1 − ρ1M0,0 ≥
M0,1M1,0 −M0,0M1,1 hold, then ρ0 ≥ M0,0 + M1,0. This holds because the two inequalities
imply
ρ1 ≤ (ρ0 −M1,0)M0,1M0,0 +M1,1 and ρ1 ≥ (ρ0 −M0,0)
M1,1
M1,0
+M0,1
⇒ ρ0
(
M0,1
M0,0
− M1,1M1,0
)
≥M0,1 −M1,1 + M1,0M0,1M0,0 −
M0,0M1,1
M1,0
⇒ ρ0 ≥
M0,0M0,1M0,1 −M0,0M1,0M1,1 +M0,1M21,0 −M20,0M1,1
M0,1M1,0 −M0,0M1,1 = M0,0 +M1,0
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Case 5. Clearly, cases 5 and 6 cannot hold simultaneously.
Lemma 5.12. Any choice of parameters for ρ0, ρ1 and the entries of M satisfies at least one of
the 6 cases detailed in Table 1.
Proof. First, suppose ρ0 ≥ M0,0 + M1,0. We claim that in this case, the value of ρ1 determines
which case holds.
• If ρ1 ≤M1,1 then case 3 holds, since obviously M1,1 ρ0M1,0 > M1,1 ≥ ρ1.
• If M1,1 < ρ1 ≤M0,1 +M1,1 then case 5 holds since
ρ0M0,1−ρ1M0,0 ≥ (M0,0+M1,0)M0,1−ρ1M0,0 = M0,1M1,0+M0,0(M0,1−ρ1) ≥M0,1M1,0−M0,0M1,1
• If ρ1 > M0,1 +M1,1 then clearly case 1 holds.
Similarly, if we have that ρ1 ≥M0,1 +M1,1, then the value of ρ0 determines whether case 2, 4 or 1
hold.
We therefore assume from now on that ρ0 < M0,0 +M1,0 and ρ1 < M0,1 +M1,1.
Suppose that ρ0ρ1 ≤
M0,0
M0,1
.
• If ρ0 ≤M0,0 then clearly case 2 holds.
• If ρ0 ≥M0,0 then we show case 4 holds. Observe ρ1ρ0 −
M1,1
M1,0
≥ M0,1M0,0 −
M1,1
M1,0
, so
ρ1M1,0−ρ0M1,1
ρ0M1,0
≥
M0,1M1,0−M0,0M1,1
M0,0M1,0
. We conclude that ρ1M1,0 − ρ0M1,1 ≥ ρ0M0,0 (M0,1M1,0 −M0,0M1,1). So the
fact that ρ0 ≥M0,0 implies that the conditions of case 4 hold.
Analogously, if we assume the ρ0ρ1 ≥
M1,0
M1,1
, then the same line of argument shows that either case 3
or case 5 hold.
So now, we assume both that ρ0 < M0,0 +M1,0, ρ1 < M0,1 +M1,1 and that
M0,0
M0,1
< ρ0ρ1 <
M1,0
M1,1
.
• If ρ1M1,0 − ρ0M1,1 ≥ M0,1M1,0 −M0,0M1,1, we argue that case 4 holds. This is because we
have both that ρ1 < ρ0
M0,1
M0,0
and that ρ1 ≥ ρ0M1,1M1,0 +M0,1 −
M0,0M1,1
M1,0
. Combining the two we
get
ρ0
(
M0,1
M0,0
− M1,1M1,0
)
>
M0,1M1,0−M0,0M1,1
M1,0
⇒ ρ0 > M0,0
• If ρ0M0,1 − ρ1M0,0 ≥ M0,1M1,0 −M0,0M1,1 then we are in the analogous case, and we can
show, using the inequality ρ0ρ1 <
M1,0
M1,1
, that ρ1 > M1,1.
This leaves us with the case that ρ0 < M0,0 + M1,0, ρ1 < M0,1 + M1,1,
M0,0
M0,1
< ρ0ρ1 <
M1,0
M1,1
and also
ρ1M1,0 − ρ0M1,1 < M0,1M1,0 −M0,0M1,1 and ρ0M0,1 − ρ1M0,0 < M0,1M1,0 −M0,0M1,1. This is
precisely case 6.
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6 Conclusions and Future Directions
Our work is a first attempt at exposing and reconciling the competing conclusions of two differ-
ent approaches to the same challenge: the theory of privacy-aware agents (where privacy loss is
modeled using differential privacy), and the behavior of standard utility-maximizing agents once
they explicitly assess future losses from having their behavior in the current game publicly exposed.
While the canonical privacy-aware agent randomizes her strategy, we show that different explicit
privacy losses cause very different behavior among agents. This is best illustrated with the game
studied in Section 4 (Theorem 4.2). In that game, agents assess their future loss and their behavior
is therefore quite simple: if the current gain is greater than the future loss, their behavior is to
truthfully report their type; otherwise they lie and report the opposite type. We believe this simple
rule explains real-life phenomena, such as people trying to hide their medical condition from the
general public while truthfully answering a doctor’s questions. 6
Observe however that in all the games we analyzed, we still have not pinned down a game
in which the behavior of a non-privacy aware agent fully mimics the behavior of a privacy-aware
agent. Privacy-aware agents’ behavior is, after a fashion, quite reasonable. They trade-off between
the value of the coupon they get and the amount of privacy (or change in belief) they are willing
to risk. Naturally, the higher the value of the coupon, the more privacy they are willing to risk.
In contrast, in the game discussed in Section 5, even under settings where B’s BNE strategy σ∗B is
randomized and satisfies Pr[σ∗B(0)] = Pr[σ
∗
B(1)], we don’t see a continuous change in B’s behavior
based on the value of the coupon. Changing solely the value of the coupon while keeping all other
parameters the same, we see that B plays the same BNE strategy, whereas A’s BNE strategy
continuously changes.
It would be interesting to pursue this line of work further, by studying more complex games. In
particular, we propose the following scenario, which resembles the standard narrative in differential-
privacy literature and should provide a complementary approach to the “sensitive surveyor” prob-
lem [GR11, NOS12, RS12, NVX14, GLRS14]. Suppose that the signal that B sends is not for a
type of coupon that gives B an immediate and fixed reward, but rather a response of B to a survey
question. That is, suppose B interacts with a benevolent data curator that wishes to learn the
distribution of type-0 and type-1 agents in the population and B may benefit from the effect of
curator’s analysis. (For example, the data curator may ask people with a certain disease about
their exposure to some substance.) In such a case, B’s utility is a function of the curator’s ability
to well approximate the true answer. In addition to the potential gain, there is also potential loss,
based on B’s concerns about her private information being publicly exposed. What formulation of
this privacy loss results in B playing according to a Randomized Response strategy? What explicit
formulation of privacy loss causes B to truthfully report her type knowing that A’s will data be
published using an -differential private mechanism?
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A Missing Proofs – Coupon Game with Proper Scoring Rules
A.1 Background: Proper Scoring Rules
Proper scoring rules (see surveys [Win96, GR07]) were devised as a method to elicit experts to
report their true prediction as to the probability of an event happening. That is, given a Bernoulli
random variable X, we ask an expert to report her estimation of µ = Pr[X = 1]. Given that
the expert reports x we pay her f1(x) if indeed X = 1 and pay her f0(x) otherwise. A proper
scoring rule is a pair of functions (f0, f1) such that arg maxx Et←X [ft(x)] = µ where the maximum
is obtained for a unique report. That is, it is in the expert’s best interest to report the true
prior. It was shown [Sav71, GR07] that a pair of twice-differentiable functions (f0, f1) give a
proper scoring rule iff there exists a convex function g (i.e. g′′ > 0 on the [0, 1] interval) s.t.
f0(x) = g(x) − xg′(x), f1(x) = g(x) + (1 − x)g′(x). Using the derivatives of both functions
(f ′0(x) = −xg′′(x) and f ′1(x) = (1 − x)g′′(x)), we deduce that f0 is a strictly decreasing function
and f1 is a strictly increasing function on the [0, 1] interval. And so, given that X = 1 w.p. µ, we
have that the expected payment for an expert predicting x is
Fµ(x) = (1− µ)f0(x) + µf1(x) = g(x)− (x− µ)g′(x) (10)
which is maximized at x = µ, where Fµ(µ) = g(µ).
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Most commonly discussed proper scoring rules are symmetric (or label-invariant) proper scor-
ing rules, that are oblivious to that outcomes of X (also referred to as neutral scoring rules
in [CDPV14]). That is, symmetric scoring rules have the property that for any two Bernoulli
random variables X and X ′ s.t. Pr[X = 1] = Pr[X ′ = 0] the expected payment for an expert
predicting x for X is identical to the payment for an expert predicting 1−x for X ′. Such symmetric
scoring rules are derived from a convex function g that is symmetric around 12 . I.e.: g(x) = g(1−x),
and so g′(x) = −g′(1− x) and g′′(x) = g′′(1− x).
Concrete examples of proper scoring rules, such as the quadratic scoring rule, the spherical
scoring rule and the logarithmic scoring rules, are discussed in Section A.2.
A.2 Strategies Under Specific Scoring Rules
We now plug-in different types of proper and symmetric scoring rules, and find what p∗ and q∗
are in each case. We analyze the game for a value of ρ s.t. the BNE is obtained where neither p∗
nor q∗ are integral. We also characterize what is the  in A’s posterior probability — the value of
maxb
{
ln
(
Pr[tˆ=t | t=b]
Pr[tˆ=1−t | t=b]
)}
.
There exists 3 canonical rules often used in literature: Quadratic, Spherical and Logarithmic.
Quadratic Scoring Rule. The quadratic scoring rule is defined by the functions (f0(x), f1(x)) =
(2 − 2x2, 4x − 2x2). The quadratic scoring rule is generated by the convex function g(x) = x2 +
(1 − x)2 + 1 = 2 − 2x + 2x2. (So, g′(x) = −2 + 4x and g′′(x) = −2.) Therefore (f ′0(x), f ′1(x)) =
(−4x, 4(1− x)).
Observe that since g′ ∈ [−2, 2], Equation (4) gives that ρ ∈ [−2, 2] as well. Hence, Equation (4)
takes the form
ρ = 2− 4
1+
D0p
D1(1−q)
⇒ D0p
D1(1− q) =
2 + ρ
2− ρ ⇒ p =
D1
D0
2 + ρ
2− ρ(1− q)
ρ = −2 + 4
1+
D0(1−p)
D1q
⇒ D0(1− p)
D1q
=
2− ρ
2 + ρ
⇒ q = D0
D1
2 + ρ
2− ρ(1− p)
So we have
p =
D1
D0
2 + ρ
2− ρ −
(
2 + ρ
2− ρ
)2
(1− p) ⇒ p =
(
2 + ρ
2− ρ
)(
D0
D1
− 2 + ρ
2− ρ
)
/
(
1−
(
2 + ρ
2− ρ
)2)
which boils down to
p =
2 + ρ
4
(
2+ρ
2−ρ − D0D1
2+ρ
2−ρ − 1
)
=
2 + ρ
4
(
2(1− D0D1 ) + ρ(1 + D0D1 )
2ρ
)
=
2 + ρ
4
(
1
2
(1 +
D0
D1
)− D0 −D1
ρD1
)
And similarly,
q =
D0
D1
2 + ρ
2− ρ −
(
2 + ρ
2− ρ
)2
(1− q) ⇒ q =
(
2 + ρ
2− ρ
)(
D1
D0
− 2 + ρ
2− ρ
)
/
(
1−
(
2 + ρ
2− ρ
)2)
which gives
q =
2 + ρ
4
(
2+ρ
2−ρ − D1D0
2+ρ
2−ρ − 1
)
=
2 + ρ
4
(
2(1− D1D0 ) + ρ(1 + D1D0 )
2ρ
)
=
2 + ρ
4
(
1
2
(1 +
D1
D0
) +
D0 −D1
ρD1
)
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More importantly, under these p and q values, y0 =
2−ρ
4 and y1 =
2+ρ
4 . So from A’s perspective,
there is a Randomized Response move here with e = y1/y0, hence
 = ln(
2 + ρ
2− ρ)
The expected utility of A is uA = g(y0) = y
2
0+y
2
1+1 =
8+2ρ2
16 +1 = 2− 12 + ρ
2
8 . This is in comparison
to g(D1) = 1 + D
2
0 + D
2
1 = 2 − 2D1 + 2D21 = 2 − 2D1(1 − D1) = 2 − 2D1D0. It follows that A
prefers the 2nd game (with the coupon) to the first only if 12 − ρ
2
8 < 2D0D1 or ρ
2 > 4 − 16D0D1.
Clearly, with D0 = D1 =
1
2 we have that A prefers the coupon game over the benchmark-game.
Spherical Scoring Rule. The spherical scoring rule is defined by the functions
(f0(x), f1(x)) = (
1− x√
x2 + (1− x)2 ,
x√
x2 + (1− x)2 )
which are generated using g(x) =
√
x2 + (1− x)2. (So, g′(x) = 2x−1√
x2+(1−x)2 and g
′′(x) = (x2 + (1−
x)2)−
3
2 .) Therefore (f ′0(x), f ′1(x)) = (−x(1− 2x+ 2x2)−
3
2 , (1− x)(1− 2x+ 2x2)−32 ).
Using the definition of g′(x), Equation (4) now yields
ρ
√
y20 + 1− 2y0 + y20 = −2y0 + 1 ⇒ (4− 2ρ2)y20 − (4− 2ρ2)y0 + (1− ρ2) = 0
ρ
√
y21 + 1− 2y1 + y21 = 2y1 − 1 ⇒ (4− 2ρ2)y21 − (4− 2ρ2)y1 + (1− ρ2) = 0
So y0 and y1 are the two different roots of the equation x
2 − x + 1−ρ2
4−2ρ2 = 0, namely
1
2 ± 12
√
ρ2
2−ρ2
Plugging in the values of y0 and y1 we have
D1q −D0(1− p)
D1q +D0(1− p) =
√
ρ2
2− ρ2
D0p−D1(1− q)
D0p+D1(1− q) =
√
ρ2
2− ρ2
and this is because we assume D0p > D1(1− q) and D1q > D0(1 − p). (That is, when we see the
signal tˆ = 0 it is more likely to come from a t = 0-type agent than a t = 1-agent, and similarly with
the tˆ = 1 signal.)
After arithmetic manipulations, we have
(1− ρ2)(D20p2 +D21(1− q)2) = 2D0D1p(1− q) ⇒ (1− ρ2)D0p = D1(1− q)
(
1± ρ
√
2− ρ2
)
(1− ρ2)(D20(1− p)2 +D21q2) = 2D0D1(1− p)q ⇒ (1− ρ2)D1q = D0(1− p)
(
1± ρ
√
2− ρ2
)
using the fact that ρ ≤ 1 and that D0p > D1(1− q) and D1q > D0(1− p), then
D0p = D1(1− q)1 + ρ
√
2− ρ2
1− ρ2
def
= ZρD1(1− q)
D1q = D0(1− p)1 + ρ
√
2− ρ2
1− ρ2
def
= ZρD0(1− p)
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(because 1− ρ
√
2− ρ2 ≤ 1− ρ ≤ 1− ρ2.) We have that
D1 = D1q +D1(1− q) = ZρD0(1− p) + 1
Zρ
D0p
D0 = D0p+D0(1− p) = ZρD1(1− q) + 1
Zρ
D1q
We deduce
p =
Z2ρ − Zρ D1D0
Z2ρ − 1
, q =
Z2ρ − Zρ D0D1
Z2ρ − 1
More importantly, from A’s perspective, the signal is like a Randomized Response with param-
eter e = y1/y0 so
 = ln(
(
1 +
√
ρ2
2− ρ2
)
/
(
1−
√
ρ2
2− ρ2
)
)
The utility of A from the game is now g(y0) which boils down to
1
2−ρ2 . This is in contrast to
D20+D
2
1, so A prefers the game with the coupon over the baseline when ρ
2 > 2− 1
D20+D
2
1
= (D0−D1)
2
D20+D
2
1
.
Complimentary to that, B’s expected payment is
ρ(D0p+D1q)− g(y0) = ρ
(
D0Z
2
ρ −D1Zρ+D1Z2ρ −D0Zρ
Z2ρ − 1
)
− 1
2− ρ2 =
ρZρ
Zρ + 1
− 2
2− ρ2
Logarithmic Scoring Rule. The logarithmic scoring rule is defined by the functions (f0(x), f1(x)) =
(ln(1 − x), ln(x)) which are generated by g(x) = −H(x) = x ln(x) + (1 − x) ln(1 − x). (So,
g′(x) = ln(x) − ln(1 − x) and g′′(x) = 1x + 11−x .) Therefore (f ′0(x), f ′1(x)) = (− 11−x , 1x). Ob-
serve that the logarithmic scoring rule has negative costs, and furthermore, we may charge infinite
cost from an expert reporting x = 0 or x = 1.
Using g′(x), Equation (4) takes the form
ρ = ln(1−y0y0 ) = ln(
y1
1−y1 ) ⇒ y0 =
1
1 + eρ
, y1 =
1
1 + e−ρ
This implies that
D0p
D1(1− q) =
D1q
D0(1− p) = e
ρ ⇒ p = e
2ρ − eρ D1D0
e2ρ − 1 , q =
e2ρ − eρ D0D1
e2ρ − 1
The Randomized Response behavior that A observes is for e = y1/y0 which means that simply
 = ρ. The utility for A is now g(y0) = − ln(1+e
ρ)
1+eρ − ln(1+e
−ρ)
1+e−ρ . And the utility for B is uB =
ρ(D0p+D1q)− g(y0) = ρ e2ρ−eρe2ρ−1 − g(y0) = ρe
ρ
eρ+1 − g(y0).
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